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‘‘Law is to justice, as medicine is to health, as business is
to _____.’’
We have asked business students and colleagues alike to
in the blank above. The ﬁrst reaction is always one of
kward silence. People are surprised that the answer does
 roll off the lips. There is always a sense in the room that
 should know the answer and yet, we do not. Then the
wers come. A cluster of people will focus on proﬁt,
ney, and wealth. Others, more expansively, will talk
ut value creation and prosperity. Still others will focus on
 likes of coordination, exchange, production, and
ovation. Some will take a decidedly macro perspective
 speak about commerce, the economy, collective well-
ng, and society. And ﬁnally, some will shift gears and
us not on wealth but greed, not prosperity but power, not
well-being but oppression. One colleague in a recent
Academy of Management symposium memorably said
‘‘our fucked-up global economy.’’ This exercise points out
three challenges when we think about the nature of
business. One is that we grapple with its purpose. The
second is that we have a hard time disentangling our
thinking about a single business enterprise from business
more broadly, an agglomeration of those enterprises in their
institutional and historical context. And ﬁnally, we know
that business may not be an unalloyed good. All of these
tensions are on display when we appraise our thinking
about the place of business in society.1
What is the purpose of business? While most agree that
the purpose of business minimally involves the creation of
value, today’s discussion is haunted by a blurred double
image of value. The image of what counts as value for a
single ﬁrm is laid atop an image of what counts as value for
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What is the purpose of business? While most agree that business minimally involves the
creation of value, a blurred double image of value haunts our discussion of purpose. The
image of what counts as value for a single ﬁrm is laid atop an image of what counts as value
for business in general. These two images cannot match. Indeed, the resulting conceptual
blurriness is a classic example of a composition fallacy. We should never mistake the
properties of a part for the properties of the whole. A theory of the ﬁrm is ill equipped to
handle the many expectations we hold for business practice. As such, we seek to establish
the beginnings of a theory of business, one that is both empirical and normative. Offering
four central propositions about the purpose, accountability, control and success of
business, we close with a consideration of several important theoretical issues and
practical opportunities that await us in the years ahead.
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1 As we consider the purpose of business in light of our understanding
of medicine and law, we will sidestep the thorny issue of whether or not
the practice of business constitutes a profession. Yes or no, the question of
purpose still matters.
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cannot match and that the resulting blurriness is a classic
example of the composition fallacy. Enumerating persis-
tent expectations and concerns about business practice,
we believe that a theory of the ﬁrm is ill equipped to handle
them. Working from a set of deﬁnitions that give precision
to such everyday concepts as value, dignity and business
success, our goal is to develop a theory with both
normative and empirical relevance. Since business works
both in society and for society (Walsh, Meyer, &
Schoonhoven, 2006), the theory must include both
empirical and normative elements. With this work as a
foundation, we then offer four central propositions about
the purpose, accountability, control, and success of
business. We will close with a consideration of several
questions, issues and opportunities that we are likely to
face in the years ahead. While this effort is admittedly
preliminary, we do hold some criteria for its success. We
hope that our ideas both align with known facts about
business practice and with deep, widely held intuitions
about values. Beyond that, we hope that others will be
moved to build upon these ideas in the coming years.
Business matters
To begin, we want to assert that business matters.2
While economic historians can debate the Industrial
Revolution’s legacy [see Allen’s (2008) review of Clark
(2007), for example], some facts are clear. Perhaps most
fundamentally, Riley (2001) observed that human life
expectancy more than doubled in the past two hundred
years (moving from about 30 to 65 years). He called that
the ‘‘crowning achievement of the modern era’’ (p. 1). To be
sure, the modern era is marked by all manner of life-saving
and life-enhancing achievements. Take medicine, engi-
neering, communications, and agriculture. Would we have
CT scanners, automobiles, smartphones, and drought
resistant seeds without business to develop the ideas,
create the products, and distribute them worldwide? Of
course not. Launching a new social progress initiative,
Porter and Stern (2015) looked at the cross-sectional
relationship between social progress (assessing what they
called basic human needs, foundations of wellbeing, and
opportunity) and economic growth (looking at GDP per
capita). Gathering data from 133 nations, they found a
correlation of 0.78. Economic and business activity can
certainly make the world a better place.3
That said we want more and less from business these
days. Tellingly, Margolis and Walsh (2003, p. 268) began
their paper entitled Misery Loves Companies, with the
words ‘‘The world cries out for repair.’’ With ﬁrms’ wealth
and capabilities so clearly on display as they reach into
factor and product markets the world over, Margolis and
Walsh observed that they are a ready target for appeal.4
Beyond providing quality goods and services at a fair price,
as well as local employment and investor wealth, ﬁrms are
also asked to sponsor all manners of public health and
community development initiatives. Koﬁ Annan’s (2001)
plea to the US Chamber of Commerce for HIV/AIDS help is
an iconic example of such an appeal: ‘‘Business is used to
acting decisively and quickly. The same cannot always be
said of the community of sovereign States. We need your
help—right now.’’ Case Western Reserve University’s David
Cooperrider created a Center at Case named ‘‘Business as
an Agent of World Beneﬁt.’’ That name captures the hopes
of so many who look to the corporation for help.
On the other hand, many fear the ﬁrm. We have been
witness to what can only be called dreadful corporate
behavior over the past three decades (Greve, Palmer, &
Ponzer, 2010). Business legitimacy, and the social trust that
serves as its foundation, has been damaged. The 1981
Savings and Loan crisis shook business conﬁdence for a
time. The business scandals of 2001 and 2002, however,
precipitated more than a decade-long loss of conﬁdence in
big business. The misconduct at Enron, Tyco, and
WorldCom launched the trend. Such misconduct brought
us the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and turned their
disgraced CEOs – Ken Lay, Dennis Kozlowski, and Bernie
Ebbers – into household names (Coates, 2007). World-
Com’s July 2002 bankruptcy was the world’s largest at the
time ($103.9B). These three 2001–2002 scandals, however,
were just the most notorious. Looking at the data on
earning restatements in the 1990–2004 time period, Coffee
(2005, p. 201) concluded that there was ‘‘a hyperbolic rate
of increase around the turn of the millennium.’’ That is
when public conﬁdence in business really started to ebb.
The concern born of the turn-of-the-century scandals
was fueled anew in September 2008 with the collapse of
Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual. With asset
values of $691B and $327.9B, respectively, each dwarfed
WorldCom’s fall and became the nation’s largest and
second largest bankruptcies in history (The 10 Largest US
Bankruptcies, 2009). As the ﬁnancial crisis worsened, the
US government stood behind many more troubled ﬁrms
and offered billions of dollars to prevent a total economic
collapse. Accounting for all of the money is a difﬁcult task
but we know, for example, that JPMorgan received $29B
from the U.S. government to buy the troubled Bear Stearns,
AIG received at least $85B to stay solvent, and all manner of
others (including General Motors) received portions of the
$700B that funded the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(Block, 2010).
2 As we point to the fruits of business, we acknowledge debates over
which economic system – socialism, capitalism, or some yet-to-be
imagined third system – is best equipped to support business activity.
That, however, is its own complex question (c.f., Kornai, 2000;
Schumpeter, 1942/2008), one that we do not attempt to address here.
3 As we say this, we know that the idea of ‘‘a better place’’ is open to
discussion. Some raise concerns about this new longevity phenomenon,
one where we live longer, die slower, and die differently than our
ancestors (Erickson, 2013, p. 6). Longevity certainly presents its
challenges (Erickson, 2013; Fishman, 2010; Gawande, 2014). And yes,
we know that CT scans expose us to radiation, automobiles pollute, smart
phones enable cyberbullying, and genetically modiﬁed foods concern 4 A factor market is sometimes called an input market. It refers to themany. Still, we suspect that most would rather face problems attendant to
‘‘progress’’ than not enjoy the beneﬁts at all.
market where resources and capabilities (e.g., historically, land, labor and
capital) necessary to produce a good or service are bought and sold.
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ut its conﬁdence in society’s institutions since 1973.
. 1 reveals the responses they have received over those
years (Gallup, 2015). It pictures the contagious loss of
iness legitimacy that we have witnessed over the past
ade or so. Legitimacy has fallen in tandem with rising
ectations – society expects more from business these
s than simply creating wealth. For example, a recent
vey tells us that just 7% of the US population believes
t business should only make money for its shareholders
ne Communications, 2013).
And so, we are torn. Taken as a whole, we hold out hope
business to be an agent of world beneﬁt but we are
ry of any single ﬁrm’s activities. While we have seen
rts to better control the ﬁrm’s worst impulses (e.g., the
banes–Oxley Act of 2002), we have also seen many
re efforts to encourage what might be called pro-social
 behavior. For example, created by the United Nations
2000, the Global Compact is the largest voluntary
ponsibility code in the world. More than 12,000
panies in 170 countries have now endorsed it. The
pact’s ten principles eschew corruption and promote
an rights, labor and environmental standards. The
en Institute, especially with its Business and Society
gram, works tirelessly to encourage business to act as
e for social good. Its Purpose of the Corporation
iative is its latest attempt to direct corporate activity for
 well-being of society (Keller-Fay Group, 2014).
pondents to Fortune magazine’s Most Admired survey
ually assess ﬁrms on how they handle their responsi-
ty to the community and environment. Voluntary
dard setting organizations like the International
anization for Standardization (with its ISO 14000
ies on environmental management) and AccountAbility
th its AA1100 sustainability, assurance and stakeholder
agement standards) work to help ﬁrms do no harm.
ory and practice in a world of wary expectation
With this kind of normative pressure on ﬁrms to serve
agents of world beneﬁt, it is no surprise to see ﬁrms
pond with a variety of what might be called corporate
ial responsibility or corporate citizenship initiatives.
attracting and retaining high quality employees (Backhaus,
Stone, & Heiner, 2002; Jones, Willness, & Madey, 2014),
cause marketing initiatives on attracting and retaining a
loyal customer base (Batra, Ahuvia, & Bagozzi, 2012;
Varadarajan & Menon, 1988), socially responsible invest-
ment practices on attracting impact investors (Dhaliwal, Li,
Tsang, & Yang, 2011; SRI Basics, 2015), and microﬁnance
initiatives’ ability to provide capital to heretofore ignored
entrepreneurs (Cull, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, & Morduch, 2009). In
addition, scholars examine attention to human rights
(Spar, 1998) and the environment (Lee & Klassen, 2008;
Sarkis, Zhu, & Lai, 2011) in supply chains. Quite expan-
sively, Porter and Kramer (2006, 2011) encouraged ﬁrms to
scour their value chain for opportunities to serve both
society and their bottom line. Perhaps not surprisingly,
PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ (2014) recent CEO survey tells
us that 68% of all CEOs believe that the purpose of business
is to balance the interests of all stakeholders. Entirely new
legal entities have recently emerged to serve this kind of
ambition. The low-proﬁt limited liability corporation and
the beneﬁt corporation, for example, are innovative
attempts to create companies that pursue proﬁt and social
good simultaneously (Reiser, 2011). Change is in the air.
Theoretical work tries to keep pace with this innova-
tion. Attentive to the yearning for social beneﬁt and to the
many innovations themselves, we see efforts to under-
stand if not guide new corporate behavior. Looking inside
the ﬁrm, the Positive Organizational Scholarship (POS)
movement tries to articulate a new management para-
digm, one based on compassion, ﬂourishing, and the
inspiration of positive deviance rather than one based on
compliance, control, and the mitigation of negative
deviance (Cameron & Spreitzer, 2013). More broadly,
alone (Prahalad, 2005; Hart, 2005) and together (Prahalad
& Hart, 2002), Prahalad and Stuart Hart tried to articulate a
new framework for business behavior, one that asks us to
look to the poorest among us for both new product and
service ideas and markets (see Kolk, Rivera-Santos, & Rufı´n,
2014 for a current review). Santos (2012) offered us a
positive theory of social entrepreneurship. And of course,
stakeholder theory has been with us for over thirty years
(Freeman, 1984). It has changed form and focus over time
but on balance, it offers the promise of a new theory of the
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Fig. 1. Conﬁdence in big business, 1973–2015., one that might help deliver more business beneﬁt toearch captures the effects of such initiatives on ﬁrm
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& DeColle, 2010). Pursuing that promise, Jones and Felps
(2013a, 2013b) recently derived a new objective function
for corporations, stakeholder happiness.
But these largely mid-range theories are not without
their critics. Speaking to the POS movement, Fineman
(2006) argued that the idea of positiveness is culturally
restrictive and not without a dark side. Hackman (2009)
worried about a lack of construct validity for many of the
movement’s key concepts. Karnani wonders if the fortune
at the bottom of the pyramid is an alluring illusion, a
mirage (Karnani, 2007). He suggested that the poor would
be better served if business, government, and civil society
worked together to create job opportunities and provide
the public services that are so necessary to live a
productive and digniﬁed life (Karnani, 2011a). While
Santos’ (2012) ideas are too new to garner criticism, we
will see if they satisfy those who wonder just what
constitutes social entrepreneurship (Dacin et al., 2012).
High aspirations notwithstanding, Jones and Felps (2013b,
p. 268) admitted that their ideas might only apply for large
publicly traded ﬁrms in developed economies that face
little competition (one wonders how such ﬁrms will co-
exist with smaller entrepreneurial ﬁrms that focus on
shareholder wealth creation and thrive in competitive
markets). Finally we all know that stakeholder theory in
broad form has been a target of criticism for years. Jensen
(2001, p. 9), for example argued:
. . .stakeholder theory should not be viewed as a
legitimate contender to value maximization because
it fails to provide a complete speciﬁcation of the
corporate purpose or objective function. . . .without the
clarity of mission provided by a single-valued objective
function, companies embracing stakeholder theory will
experience managerial confusion, conﬂict, inefﬁciency,
and perhaps even competitive failure.
These theoretical skirmishes are really a part of a larger
battle about the purpose of the ﬁrm. It is a battle fought for
decades, if not centuries (Avi-Yonah, 2005). The modern
debate began in the pages of the Harvard Law Review. Berle
(1931, p. 1049), worried about managers’ power and their
unfettered control of the corporation (Bratton & Wachter,
2008), averred that ‘‘the powers granted to the corporation
or the management of the corporation – are necessary and
at all times exercisable only for the rateable beneﬁt of all
the shareholders as their interest appears.’’ As a matter of
theoretical parsimony and practical necessity, the interests
of the ﬁrm’s equity investors needed to be afﬁrmed and
protected from those looking to run off with their money.
In clear sympathy with the need for investor protection,
Dodd (1932, p. 1148) nevertheless asserted that the
business corporation ‘‘has a social service as well as
proﬁt-making function.’’ And so began the great modern
debate about the purpose of the corporation. Those
steeped in neo-classical economics tend to side with Berle.
Call them contractarians, shareholder-primacy theorists,
or those in the ﬁrm-as-property camp, they clearly see the
ﬁrm as accountable to the ﬁrm’s equity holders. If asked
about the ﬁrm’s social purpose, they point to the title of
New York Times – ‘‘The social responsibility of business is to
increase its proﬁts.’’ Asked and answered.
But the question was not answered. Others, call them
communitarians, stakeholder theorists, or those in the
ﬁrm-as-entity camp, see the ﬁrm as broadly accountable to
society.5 Calling to mind the charters that ﬁrst served as a
basis for – and constraint on – corporate activity, Nader,
Green, and Seligman’s (1976) book, Taming the Giant
Corporation, chronicled the social and economic cost
attendant to these new large and powerful corporations.
They called for a radical solution, a federal chartering
system, to ensure that society is well served by corporate
activity. Right or wrong (Walsh, 2005), many saw the
publication of Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder theory as a
direct antidote to the likes of Friedman (1970). Still,
Freeman (1994, p. 413) distanced himself from radical
rejections of stockholder–centric approaches. He knew
that his ideas were preliminary:
The temptation has been for a long time to depict the
stakeholder concept as a kind of rallying cry against the
stockholder theory. Armed with stakeholder maps on
our shields and banners, we have marched forth to
browbeat the inﬁdels, mostly economists and ﬁnance
theorists . . . and show them that stakeholder theory is
‘‘better’’ than stockholder theory. [He confessed,] There
is no such thing as the stakeholder theory. . . .it is a
genre of stories about how we could live.
The challenges of globalization and the loss of
legitimacy noted above rekindled the debate at the turn
of the century (Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram, & Walsh,
1999). Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) clashed with Free-
man, Wicks, & Parmar (2004), Siegel (2009) sparred with
Marcus and Fremeth (2009), and Karnani (2011b) debated
with Rivoli and Waddock (2011) about the purpose,
accountability, and control of the ﬁrm. The neoclassical
theory of the ﬁrm is clearly under strain (Stout, 2012). It
appears to be incapable of harboring our dreams for
business practice that promotes social harmony, environ-
mental stewardship and at the same time, economic
prosperity.
A beleaguered straw man
Our extant understanding of business conduct is drawn
largely from economics, speciﬁcally what is known as neo-
classical economics. The economists offer us a theory of the
ﬁrm, telling us why the ﬁrm exists and how commerce in a
world of ﬁrms differs from commerce in a world of market
exchange. Known broadly as the neo-classical theory of the
ﬁrm, the power and reach of this work is impressive.
Indeed, William Allen, former Chancellor of the Delaware
Court of Chancery, once remarked, ‘‘One of the marks of a
truly dominant intellectual paradigm is the difﬁculty
5 The stakeholder/shareholder (Freeman et al., 2010), communitarian/
contractarian (Daniels, 1993), and entity/property (Allen, 1992) language
differences reﬂect paradigmatic differences. Management theorists prefer
the stakeholder/shareholder language, while legal scholars use the otherterms. Bradley et al. (1999, p. 44) offer a helpful table that summarizes the
differences between the two camps.Milton Friedman’s (1970) – now famous essay in the
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3, p. 1401). Alternative theories have had a hard time
ning traction.
The ‘‘neo-classical’’ theory of the ﬁrm is really a bundle
theories, all loosely connected by their utilization of
cepts drawn from this view of economics. Seeing
ividuals as primarily self-interested economic agents,
 theories are all grounded in notions of contractual
dom, with an emphasis on prices and outputs
strained by demand. The striking success of the neo-
sical approach to the ﬁrm owes much to the genius of
grating our understanding of ﬁrms with the estab-
ed concepts of neo-classical economics. Importantly,
y give us a theoretical account for why ﬁrms exist in a
rket economy. Moreover, these theories allow internal
sactions to be related to market transactions, ﬁrm
ctures (i.e., hierarchy) to be related to cost constraints
the broader markets, and concepts such as free-
hange and contracting to be adjusted in order to
erstand ﬁrm behavior. Not all theories, however, make
 same assumptions or have the same aims. Gibbons
05, p. 239) offers a typology that effectively distin-
shes among different theories of the ﬁrm depending on
ir foci: rent-seeking, property rights, incentive-system,
daptation (see especially pp. 200–201).
The literature utilizing the neo-classical theories of the
 surged after Ronald Coase (1937), the 1991 Nobel
reate, published his seminal paper entitled ‘‘The Nature
he Firm.’’ While the work in this area is expansive, one
am examines the boundaries of the ﬁrm vis-a`-vis the
rket [c.f., Williamson (1985) and his work on transaction
t economics] and another on the challenge of organizing
 controlling work in the ﬁrm [c.f., Jensen and Meckling
76) and their work on agency theory]. These ideas have
wn extensive scholarly attention over the years [see
ton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton (2007), Shapiro (2005), and
eifer and Vishny (1997) for reviews of agency theory and
ter and Hodgson (2006), David and Han (2004), Macher
 Richman (2008), and Shelanski and Klein (1995) for
iews of transaction cost economics]. Their conceptions
gency, transaction costs, hierarchies, hold-up problems,
king, asset speciﬁcity, and complete and incomplete
tracts offer compelling accounts of many aspects of ﬁrm
avior. Our understanding of corporate governance has
ecially beneﬁtted from this work. And yet, fundamental
stions about the purpose and accountability of the ﬁrm
 still contested. The concerns are of two types: There
 what might be called proximate concerns, those born
a close look at the theories’ assumptions and central
structs; and then there are those that might be called
al concerns. They come into view when we look beyond
 theories themselves to consider how well they actually
ture and inform organizational life and in particular,
 well society beneﬁts from their embrace. We will
sider each in turn.
ximate concerns
The neo-classical theory of the ﬁrm has been under
tiny for decades. Its salience and very success no doubt
critics. Many of them approach the theory on its own
terms, granting some of its major assumptions and
challenging others. Davis (2005), for example, questions
whether shareholders truly ‘‘own’’ the corporation. Some
transfer well-known concerns about neo-classical eco-
nomics to the theory of the ﬁrm. Concerns about the
absence of perfect information, methodological individu-
alism (i.e., the idea that social phenomena can best be
understood as a function of individual intent and action),
and the oversimpliﬁcation of complex social behavior, for
example, are all raised in this domain as well (Granovetter,
1985; Perrow, 1986a, 1986b). Others criticize the practical
implications of the theory. Calling the theory’s prescrip-
tions ‘‘wrong’’ and ‘‘dangerous,’’ Ghoshal and Moran (1996,
p. 13) argued that managers who unwittingly implement
these ideas could do more harm than good (see Ghoshal,
2005 for an elaboration of that accusation). Ferraro, Pfeffer,
& Sutton (2005) warned us that such theories could
become self-fulﬁlling. Still others worry about the double-
sided epistemic face of the theory. They worry that it can
be deployed – again unwittingly – as either a positive or a
normative behavioral account. The ensuing confusion does
us little good (Coff, 1999; Donaldson, 2012; Kim &
Mahoney, 2010; Zingales, 2000). To be sure, all theories
have their limitations. Problems will draw earnest
attempts to ﬁx them; the theory will be reﬁned in time.
Even still, one can wonder about the ultimate utility of the
ideas comprising the neo-classical theory. One can wonder
how well these unalloyed ideas, perhaps even with their
coming reﬁnements, serve society.
Distal concerns
These concerns are audible and paradoxically, some-
times inaudible. The noisy protests, attendant to the
aggressive pursuit of competitive advantage and proﬁt, are
unmistakable. Taibbi (2009), for example, began his
critique of Wall Street’s role in the recent ﬁnancial crisis
with these now infamous words:
The ﬁrst thing you need to know about Goldman Sachs
is that it’s everywhere. The world’s most powerful
investment bank is a great vampire squid wrapped
around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its
blood funnel into anything that smells like money.
The toll that our recent economic problems took on the
lives of everyday Americans is well known (Grusky,
Western, & Wime, 2011). The business misbehavior that
so fueled the crisis of conﬁdence captured by the Gallup
organization is well chronicled in the media. Other
concerns, perhaps endemic to everyday business decision
making, may not always claim a front page headline.
Newsworthy just the same, they often constitute what are
known theoretically as negative externalities.
With proﬁt the remainder as we subtract costs from
revenue, a ﬁrm naturally wants to minimize its costs.
Problems arise when ﬁrms pass their costs on to others.
Observers of contemporary business are quite concerned
about externalities. The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2014) offers a succinctnition of the phenomenon:ated its status as a high-value target for academic deﬁ
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production or consumption of goods and services
imposes costs or beneﬁts on others which are not
reﬂected in the prices charged for the goods and
services being provided.
The most obvious example may be the pollution that
can accompany manufacturing. While the consumers of a
company’s goods may not pay for the cost of this pollution,
society certainly pays for it with a diminished quality of life
(Brandt et al., 2013). Other examples are legion. The
tobacco industry takes the lives of many of its customers
(Pierce, Gilpin, & Choi, 1999). In doing so, it wreaks havoc
with their families and imposes a public health burden on
the rest of us. The food industry contributes to childhood
obesity and a near epidemic of Type II diabetes (Lewin,
Lindstrom, & Nestle, 2006). The deleterious effects of the
gambling industry on the lives of its patrons and neighbors
are palpable. Grinols and Mustard (2001), for example,
identiﬁed ten social costs that follow the opening of a
casino. They tracked, for example, how the presence of
a casino can affect the perhaps obvious cost of an increase
in criminal activity, as well as ones that may not be so
obvious. For example, they called attention to what they
called ‘‘abused dollars.’’ Gamblers borrow this (soon to be
lost) money from family and friends under false pretences.
It is important to note that negative externalities can be
borne not just by today’s citizens but by future generations
as well (World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment, 1987).
While scandal and negative externalities sometimes
garner protest, we are struck by the silence that greets so
much of this news. To be sure, the ﬁnancial scandals of the
early 2000s contributed to the passage of the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act. Scandal can fuel reform. Still, we have become
desensitized to egregious ﬁrm behavior. Consider the past
ﬁve years. In 2010, we learned that a Dutch court found
Traﬁgura guilty of illegally dumping toxic waste. Instead of
paying to process the waste in the Netherlands, the ship
sailed to the Ivory Coast and dumped it there, sickening
over 100,000 people (Traﬁgura found guilty of exporting
toxic waste, 2010).6 Already under ﬁre for hacking the
phones of celebrities and politicians in search of tabloid
gossip, we learned in 2011 that The News Corporation
crossed a line into the world of the utterly despicable. In
search of the sensational story, they hacked into the
phones of terrorist bombing victims, deceased Iraqi
soldiers, and even a murdered schoolgirl (Watson &
Hickman, 2013). In 2012, HSBC paid a $1.9B ﬁne after
being accused of laundering money for Mexican drug
trafﬁckers and such countries as Burma, Iran, Libya, and
Sudan (McCoy, 2012). We learned the next year (on April
24, 2013) that the Rana Plaza garment factory building
collapsed in Dhaka, Bangladesh. More than 1100 people
perished (Burke, 2013). Dov Charney, the founder and
long-time CEO of American Apparel, was ﬁnally deposed in
2014 after presiding over what was euphemistically called
‘‘a sexually charged workplace’’ (Berﬁeld, 2014). And
ﬁnally, 2015 bore witness to two scandals of massive
proportions. First, we ﬁrst learned that the CEO and ﬁve
members of the board of directors of Petrobras, the largest
company in Brazil, were forced to resign after suffering
$33B in losses due to corruption and ﬁnancial misman-
agement. The scandal even found its way to the ofﬁce of
the country’s president (Iraheta, 2015). Second, we learned
that Volkswagen cynically skirted emissions laws on
11 million vehicles in the US, defrauding its customers
and exposing the world to dangerous levels of toxic
pollutants, all in its quest to become the world’s largest
automaker (Hakim et al., 2015).
We hear such news, see it as a tragedy, and then
continue to live as if it never happened. Our seeming
acquiescence in the face of such tragedy is itself a tragedy.
Indeed, some readers’ minds may even wander as they
read these words, muttering to themselves, ‘‘Oh no, not
another business ethics paper that tries to grab our
attention with horriﬁc tales of business misbehavior and
malfeasance. . .’’ We know that the children who play
violent video games become desensitized to the violence,
demonstrating less empathy and prosocial behavior in
their lives (Anderson et al., 2010). It may very well be that
the persistent exposure to corporate wrongdoing and to
businesses’ negative externalities simply desensitizes us
to these problems. Yes, we want more from business. And
yes, we are drawn to initiatives that promise world beneﬁt.
However, seeking broad theoretical guidance and legiti-
macy for more prosocial ﬁrm behavior, theorists see little
choice but to challenge – again and again – the dominant
neo-classical theory of the ﬁrm. Hollensbe, Wookey,
Hickey, George, and Nichols’ (2014) heartfelt plea for a
renewed focus on corporate purpose is perhaps the most
recent example. They are eager to discover ‘‘how corporate
purpose and the values that drive it might best be brought
together in the service of society’’ (p. 1228).
Sensing some futility, we are reminded of Winston
Churchill’s now famous words to the House of Commons
on November 11, 1947: ‘‘No one pretends that democracy
is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that
democracy is the worst form of Government except for
all those other forms that have been tried from time to
time. . .’’ Channeling Churchill, one might say, ‘‘No one
pretends that the neo-classical theory of the ﬁrm is perfect
or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that the neo-classical
theory of the ﬁrm may the worst theory of the ﬁrm, except
for all those other theories that have been tried from time
to time.’’ Indeed, for all the hearty and heartfelt criticism of
contractarianism, the communitarian paradigm may not
offer a positive logic to organize economic production. It
may be more of a protest movement than a workable
theory of economic production (Bradley et al., 1999, p. 47).
Still, it may be time to give the neo-classical theory of the
ﬁrm, our beleaguered straw man, a break. The solution to
our theoretical problems may lie elsewhere.
On balance, the neo-classical theory of the ﬁrm may
serve business leaders fairly well. The issue is that the
theory was not developed to address society’s interest in
business activity, the source of the distal problems we
6 Greenpeace detailed the charges and excoriated the company in a
231-page report entitled The Toxic Truth hhttp://www.greenpeace.org/
international/en/publications/Campaign-reports/Toxics-reports/The-
Toxic-Truth/i
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l and deserve attention, the distal questions and
cerns pose problems for a theory ill equipped to handle
m. We do not need a theory of the ﬁrm to address these
blems; we need a theory of business. We need a theory
t can answer the riddle posed at the beginning of this
rk: ‘‘Law is to justice, as medicine is to health, as
iness is to _____?’’ Absent such a theory, we suffer a
acy of composition.
allacy of composition
A fallacy is a form of deceptively bad argument. A
acy of composition occurs when one assumes that the
perty of a part, or of all parts, can be taken to represent
 whole. Hansen (2015, p. 5), a philosopher who has
tten widely about fallacies, offers the following
mple: Every member of the investigative team is an
ellent researcher. Therefore, the team is an excellent
. This inference will not hold if the team members do
 work well together. There is more to an excellent team
n the quality of its membership.
Such a deceptive line of reasoning can tempt false
clusions in management theory. Imagine that the
pose of a ﬁrm is to maximize its shareholders’ wealth
say, to delight its customers. We must remember that a
gle ﬁrm is just one part of the broad agglomeration of
s that comprise business activity, activity that sits
arely in its institutional and historical context. We
uld take great care before we conclude that the purpose
business is to maximize shareholder returns or to
ight customers. The composition fallacy alerts us to the
sibility that the attributes of a successful ﬁrm may not
the same as the attributes of successful business in
eral.
A closely related confusion, while not a fallacy per se, is
 conﬂation of business means with business ends.
rational efﬁciency, for example, may be crucial to a
’s success and even to business success, but it would be
istake to conclude that efﬁciency itself is any kind of
mate ﬁrm or business goal. The temptation to do so is
l but we need to be alert to the problem of goal
lacement as we consider purpose, especially if that
pose is more intangible than many of the means to that
 (Warner & Havens, 1968). Consider engines. At a time
en the social sciences grapple with bouts of physics
y (Flyvberg, 2001), a look at the limitations of physics is
tructive.
One can deﬁne a mechanical engine as a machine with
ving parts that converts power into motion. There have
n and are many engines: the ancient Greek (Hero)
d–wheel engine that drove an organ, the steam engine
t drove locomotives, the modern internal combustion
ine that is ubiquitous today, and the atomic ﬁssion
ine that powers nuclear submarines. Physical theories
ling with one particular aspect of engines, namely, their
lity to overcome friction and convert power into
tion, have inspired more and more efﬁcient engines.
 as powerful as these ideas have been for improving
ciency, we do not fully understand what an engine
lly is until we relate it to its human value. Even a
supremely intelligent scientist from another galaxy would
not know what an ‘‘engine’’ is without some theory that
references its use and purpose, such as in transportation.
Otherwise, it is simply a ‘‘machine with moving parts.’’
Similarly, it is impossible to understand fully the nature
of business in society by simply looking at the descrip-
tive principles that undergird the creation of a ﬁrm in
society.
Our goal here is to begin to develop a conceptually
robust theory of business. Again, it will be an empirical and
normative theory. Well aware of the promise of value free
science – and the scorn that may befall those who bring a
consideration of values to science – we are nevertheless
intent on developing a normative theory. Not mincing
words, Weber (1922/1968, pp. 152, 155) pointed to the
peril in our path:
Science today is a ‘vocation’ organized in special
disciplines in the service of self-clariﬁcation and
knowledge of interrelated facts. It is not the gift of
grace of seers and prophets dispensing sacred values
and revelations, nor does it partake of the contempla-
tion of sages and philosophers about the meaning of the
universe.’’ He went on to say, ‘‘To the person who
cannot bear the fate of the times like a man, one must
say: may he rather return silently, without the usual
publicity build-up of renegades, but simply and plainly.
The arms of the old churches are opened widely and
compassionately for him.
With all respect to such a towering intellectual ﬁgure,
we cannot bear the fate of our times silently. If there are
sacred values that might commingle with rigorous
scientiﬁc inquiry to better humanity, then we are remiss
to ignore them. We cannot duck a consideration of the
human value of business activity as we seek to understand
it. Amartya Sen, the 1998 Noble Laureate, pointed out that
‘‘economic sense’’ is deﬁned in either of two ways: one
includes the achievement of a good society; the other
narrowly concerns itself with business proﬁts and rewards
(Sen, 1993, p. 52). We hope to deﬁne and expand the ﬁrst of
these two notions, the economic sense that undergirds a
good society. In the end, we hope to account for the audible
and inaudible concerns we identiﬁed above. We intend to
account for the intellectual disenchantment, the third
party activism, and the contemporary search for new
business models. As we do, we will pay close attention to
fundamental intuitions about the nature of the human
person and humanity.
Theoretical foundations
Deﬁnitions for a theory of business
Language brings our world into relief. Specialized
languages such as mathematics, logic, topology, and yes,
economics, systemize thinking with extreme clarity. The
linguistic philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, compared
specialized languages to new suburbs in urban areas—they
are new entrants to an existing linguistic territory
(Wittgenstein, 1953). As we have seen, however, the
critics and defenders of the beleaguered straw man, the
T. Donaldson, J.P. Walsh / Research in Organizational Behavior 35 (2015) 181–207188neo-classical theory of the ﬁrm, often talk past one another
because the specialized language of neo-classical theories
has difﬁculty interpreting issues lying outside its scope.
The strength of specialized languages is that they embody
sharper tools for particular purposes. Their weakness
connects to their strength, however; their acuity comes at
the cost of conceptual narrowness. For example, the
language of DNA and genetic biology may do a good job of
explaining how a zygote becomes a human being but it
does a poor job of explaining how a human being will fall
in love with another, create a new zygote, and reproduce
the species.
When neo-classical theories of governance are criti-
cized for a failure to address issues outside their purview
(e.g., for failing to address broad questions of sustainabili-
ty), critics must borrow terms lying outside the specialized
language. They are forced to borrow terminology from
natural languages, using such words citizenship, stake-
holder, team, and family to make their case. They are
driven to frame corporations as corporate citizens,
production teams, collections of stakeholders, or even
families. Inevitably, their criticisms appear less sophisti-
cated than the theories they criticize.
Neo-classical theories function reasonably well for their
designed purpose. The issue is that their purpose is limited.
In order to reach beyond their designed scope, we require
different terms and different theories. If we want to
achieve distinctive depth and clarity, we require a
specialized language. The specialized language of any
theory is effected through the articulation of deﬁnitions,
postulates, and assumptions. From Euclidian geometry to
Newtonian Physics and modern microeconomics, the
crucial elements of theory are deﬁnitions. For this reason,
we begin our effort to develop a theory of business by ﬁrst
articulating a set of basic deﬁnitions. Our aspirations are
modest. We do not mean to offer the last word on a
prospective theory of business. Instead, we offer a ﬁrst. We
invite others to assess our elementary deﬁnitions and then
help us reﬁne and extend them. The project we envision
is a long-term one. Only the cooperation of a great many
colleagues will ensure its success.
Any theory of business needs to focus on four key ideas.
Three of these are common to the contemporary literature
on corporate governance, namely, we must consider the
purpose, accountability and control of business. And given
that ours is to be a normative theory as well as an
empirical one, we will appraise the ultimate conduct of
business—we will consider the nature of business success.
With these four aspirations in mind, we offer the following
deﬁnitions.
1. Business: a form of cooperation involving the Produc-
tion, Exchange and Distribution of goods and services
for the purpose of achieving Collective Value.
2. Business Participant: someone who affects or is
affected by the pursuit of Collective Value. Some
Business Participants are identiﬁed through their
membership in entities that affect or are affected by
the pursuit of Collective Value.
3. Positive Value: a reason for acting where the object of
4. Negative Value: a reason for acting where the object of
the act is seen as aversive.
5. Intrinsic Value: a Positive Value whose worth does not
depend on its ability to achieve other Positive Values.
6. Beneﬁt: the contributions made by Business to the
satisfaction of a Business Participant’s Positive and
Intrinsic Values, net of any aversive impact on the
satisfaction of those same values.
7. Collective Value: the agglomeration of the Business
Participants’ Beneﬁts, again, net of any aversive
Business outcomes.
8. Dignity: an Intrinsic Value prescribing that each
Business Participant be treated with respect, compati-
ble with each person’s inherent worth.
9. Dignity Threshold: the minimum level of respect
accorded to each Business Participant necessary to
allow the agglomeration of Beneﬁt to qualify as
Business Success.
10. Business Success: optimized Collective Value, opti-
mized subject to clearing the Dignity Threshold.
Equiﬁnalty assumed, alternative states of Business
Success are possible.
Business and business participants
We understand Business to include a system of
production, exchange, and distribution relationships
among and between the entities that constitute ﬁrms’
value chains: ﬁrms themselves, civil society, institutions of
government, and the communities that both sustain and
beneﬁt from business activity. All of these entities, and the
individuals that comprise them, participate in business
activity. However, we reserve the term ‘‘Business Partici-
pant’’ for those who are the ultimate bearers of value,
namely, persons. Many but not all Business Participants are
identiﬁed through their membership in business entities.
The term, Business Participant, expansively includes
anyone who affects or is affected by business. As such,
our deﬁnition echoes Freeman’s (1984) capacious intuition
about stakeholder identiﬁcation. That said, we use the
term ‘‘participant’’ and not ‘‘stakeholder’’ here. We do so
because of the latter’s longstanding association with the
management of discrete business entities, not the conduct
of business broadly (as we are examining here).7 Produc-
tion is a cooperative process in which inputs generate
outputs, goods or services in the world of business.
Exchange is a voluntary and cooperative process in which
a good or a service is given in anticipation of a return. And
distribution captures both the cooperative processes by
which those goods and services reach their buyers and the
resulting pattern of who does or does not buy them.
7 For example, note that Freeman et al. (2010) began their impressive
review and assessment of stakeholder theory by talking about ‘‘a
business’’ [‘‘Stakeholder theory suggests that if we adopt as the unit of
analysis the relationship between a business and the groups and
individuals who can affect or are affected by it, then. . .’’ (p. 5)]. They
ended their book talking about ‘‘the business’’ [‘‘. . .at the center of
starting, managing, and leading a business is a set of stakeholder
relationships which deﬁne the business’’ (p. 291)]. Taking absolutelynothing away from stakeholder theory and its many contributions, our
focus here is different.the act is seen as worthy of pursuit.
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phasizes cooperation instead of competition. To be sure,
petition plays an essential role in business. Many even
 it as the heartbeat of market capitalism. Still, if we want
understand the purpose, accountability, control, and
cess of business, we must place competition in its
per context. Competition is signiﬁcant because it serves
n important means to maximize value. However, it is
 the only means to create value. The ability of groups to
perate in competitive systems is also recognized as a
ical economic success factor (Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon,
7; Markussen, Reuben, & Tyran, 2014). With competi-
 so celebrated in contemporary society (Stalk, 2006;
lk & Lachenauer, 2004), we need to be alert to goal
lacement (means/ends inversion). We need to keep in
d that competition itself is not the goal of business.
Effective competition requires the social consent that
 see embodied in our cooperative institutions. For
mple, an independent judiciary that enforces contracts
 property rights and the regulatory institutions that
stall harmful monopolies together enable markets
function properly. Social contracts help to form the
mative underpinnings of business (Donaldson &
fee, 1994, 1995, 1999; Sacconi, 2006, 2007). We
peratively create, manage and participate in competi-
 markets to create collective value.
itive and negative values
The term ‘‘value’’ is commonly heard in discussions of
nomics and business. Interestingly, it is often left
eﬁned, or when deﬁned, interpreted through a price
chanism or systematized preference rankings (includ-
 the analysis of indifference). In contrast, the concept of
ue is ubiquitous and the object of extensive analysis in
ral theory. Each one of the many respected attempts to
temize morals over more than two millennia may be
 to entail some deﬁnition of value, either directly or
irectly (Aquinas, 1945; Aristotle, 1962; Hamilton &
rns, 1961; Kant, 1949, 1959; Mill, 2001; Moore, 1903;
s, 1930; Sidgwick & Jones, 1901; Spinoza & Parkinson,
0). That said, non-philosophers are often surprised not
he divergence of ethical views in moral philosophy, but
their convergence. While disagreements rage over
ta-ethical issues such as moral realism (the question of
ether moral qualities are reﬂected directly in ‘‘facts’’),
 more basic normative moral questions have surpris-
ly convergent answers. Noisy disputes about abortion,
 marriage, and the role of religion in society may
mand our attention, but the fact is that we all share
ilar views about such basic values as health, dignity,
 justice.
Popularized by Rawls (1971/1999, 1993/2005), the
 ‘‘overlapping consensus’’ denotes how people who
port different underlying normative doctrines, includ-
 different religious doctrines, can still agree on speciﬁc
ciples of justice. We use it here more expansively to
r to values that are endorsed, although to varying
rees, by people with different cultural and religious
ws. For example, some version of the Golden Rule is
nd in every one of the world’s major religions. Members
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 without
dissent. It enshrines such basic values as dignity and
freedom. In the world of positive psychology, Dahlsgaard,
Peterson, & Seligman (2005) examined Eastern and
Western philosophical and religious traditions, isolating
six core virtues that recur in the writings: courage, justice,
humanity, temperance, wisdom, and transcendence. Re-
latedly, social psychologists often ﬁnd patterned regularity
when they examine moral notions around the world (Haidt
& Kesebir, 2010). In all, we see an overlapping global
consensus about such values as freedom, beneﬁcence, self-
control, knowledge, happiness, family, friendship, envi-
ronmental quality, security, integrity, the right to own
property, self-respect, and fairness. In business, the same is
true. A recent global survey found that employees agree on
core standards such as integrity, fair dealing and promise
keeping (Paine, Deshpande, & Margolis, 2011). This kind of
convergence offers a clue to the non-arbitrary foundation
for the classiﬁcation of human values.8 We will elaborate
upon that non-arbitrary status when we better consider
the deﬁnition of Intrinsic Value.
We deﬁne a Positive Value as a reason for acting when
the object of the act is seen as worthy of pursuit. In other
words, a Positive Value is someone’s reason for acting. This
deﬁnition taps a deep legacy in moral philosophy, one that
deﬁnes values in terms of reasons and one that relates
values to human interests (c.f., Perry, 1914, 1926). By
deﬁnition, some reason or other, whether good or bad,
motivates intentional behavior. T.M. Scanlon’s view,
reﬂected in the approaches of contemporary moral
theorists, is that ‘‘to call something valuable is to say that
it has other properties that provide reasons for behaving in
certain ways with respect to it’’ (Scanlon, 1998, p. 96). The
language of values can confuse because insofar as ‘‘value’’
is a noun, the term suggests that values are things in the
world, akin to physical objects. But using value as noun is
not meant to reify values; it is simply a shorthanded way to
reference the process of deliberate action wherein
someone acts for an underlying reason.
In turn, a Negative Value constitutes a reason for not
acting or avoiding something undesirable or aversive. It is
often the negative form of a positive value. For example,
the negative value of sickness ﬁnds its opposite in the
positive value of health. We introduce the concept of
negative and positive values in order to capture the
richness of ordinary language. Some words in a given
language express a value even though the language lacks
an exact word for its opposite (in such cases, we struggle to
ﬁnd many words to serve as an antonym). The word
‘‘interference,’’ for example, ﬁnds no precise English
language opposite. While words like cooperation, facilita-
tion, encouragement, enable and assist come to mind, a
8 Contrariwise, the cynical view of ethics expressed in the so-called
doctrine of ‘‘normative ethical relativism’’ is not seriously defended in
moral philosophy. This doctrine holds that ‘‘If someone thinks it is right
(or wrong) to do A, then it is right (or wrong) for him to do A.’’ As Richard
Brandt noted, despite rather wide popular acceptance, this doctrine is
thought to be absurd by philosophers because it implies ‘‘that there is not in debating with a person [about] what is right for him to do unless
s in doubt himself’’ (Brandt, 1967, p. 76).the United Nation’s General Assembly endorsed the
poin
he i
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absence of interference, or ‘‘non-interference.’’ That said, it
may be necessary to assume precise value polarity (i.e., the
idea that any negative value can be construed as the
negation of a positive value, and vice versa) when we
grapple with how best to measure value satisfaction.
A value can serve as one person’s reason for acting and
not another’s. In other words, values can be matters of
personal taste. My reason for acting in a particular instance
may be to avoid buying a car, and yours may be the
opposite. You may want to buy a car to stop riding a city
bus; I may move to a convenient bus line in order to sell my
car. Such values, whether positive or negative, are agent-
speciﬁc.
Intrinsic value
Some values are not agent-speciﬁc. Such values are
Intrinsic Values. Suppose that owning more land is a value
for you, and someone asks you why you value owning
more land. If you attempt to give a persuasive answer, you
need to appeal to a higher-order reason that is under-
standable to the questioner. You might reply that owning
more land gives you a sense of security, with the inference
that your higher-order reason is the value of security. This
answer may well satisfy your questioner since the both of
you probably agree that security is a value. But suppose the
person surprises you and follows up with another
question, ‘‘Why do you value security?’’ Here, your reply
may well be something like ‘‘I don’t value security for some
further reason; rather, security is something I think has
intrinsic worth.’’ In other words, you would be saying, ‘‘I
think security is an intrinsic value.’’ When something that
is ‘‘worthy of pursuit’’ does not have its own value derived
from a higher-order value, it counts as an Intrinsic Value. It
is a ﬁnal reason for acting. Intrinsic values, in turn, possess
an ‘‘objective’’ normative status. Even were society to form
an overlapping consensus afﬁrming the rightness of
slavery, society would be wrong. The intrinsic value of
personal freedom tenders a non-relative claim.
Many if not all of our important values are dependent
ultimately on higher-order values that are intrinsic in this
sense. One may value wealth partly because one values the
capacity to be charitable (i.e., to display beneﬁcence).
Beneﬁcence itself, however, need not be derived from
some other value. It can stand on its own two feet.
Accordingly, we deﬁne an Intrinsic Value as a form of value
whose worth does not depend on its ability to achieve
other Positive Values. It is non-derivative. Moreover, in a
world where others call us to account for our conduct, an
intrinsic value can serve as a primary justiﬁcation for
behavior. Understandable as a good reason for any person,
it constitutes a ﬁnal reason for acting.
Both intrinsic and non-intrinsic values can be under-
stood in two different ways, ways that correspond roughly
to reasons that concern goods and reasons that concern
principles. A person may act for the sake of either ‘‘having a
good’’ or for the sake of a ‘‘principle.’’ Rawls’s (1971)
‘‘primary goods’’ (i.e., those ‘‘things that every rational man
is presumed to want’’) count as reasons in the former
category. However, an alternate way to speak about
may act for the sake of a moral principle such as
beneﬁcence, integrity, or promise keeping.
One might challenge the idea of intrinsic values by saying,
‘‘Show me a deﬁnitive list of intrinsic values!’’ Philosophers
have constructed and defended many such lists over the
years. Two of the best known are W.D. Ross’s list of ‘‘Prima
Facie Duties’’ (Ross, 1930) and William Frankena’s list of
‘‘intrinsic goods’’ (Frankena, 1973). Frankena’s long list
includes such values as cooperation, experiences of achieve-
ment, self-expression, freedom, peace, security, adventure,
and novelty (Frankena, 1973, pp. 87–88).9 Of course, people
investigate these lists to see if they are in fact, intrinsic. Some
wonder if all such intrinsic goods can be subsumed under a
single overarching intrinsic value or failing that, rank-
ordered. This question has been debated for hundreds of
years. Adam Smith (1759/1981), for example, argued that
the most important human value is beneﬁcence. Immanuel
Kant (1959: 11) later identiﬁed ‘‘a good will’’ as the
overarching value: ‘‘Nothing in the world – indeed nothing
even beyond the world – can possibly be conceived which
could be called good without qualiﬁcation except a good
will.’’ John Stuart Mill (2001) later argued that happiness is
that single overarching intrinsic value. As we noted above,
Jones and Felps (2013a; 2013b) recently introduced this
view to the contemporary world of corporate governance.
Interesting as it may be, we do not need to resolve this
debate here. We simply point out that intrinsic values exist.
As we will see, this fact is essential to any theory of business.
Beneﬁt
Beneﬁt represents the contributions made by Business
to the satisfaction of a Business Participant’s Values,
including his or her Intrinsic Values. Because excellent
production in a cooperative context (Business) is marked
by the efﬁcient production of goods and services, it follows
that the values likely to be fulﬁlled in business are those
best served by the functions of production and exchange.
Such values include physical security, healthcare, personal
freedom, family support, education, and charity. Indeed,
while the methodological and econometric challenges are
many, the current evidence seems to suggest that there is a
positive relationship between wealth (looking at both GDP
per capita and household income) and reported measures
of well-being. The well-being measures are very abstract.
Diener, Tay, and Oishi (2013, p. 269) and Sacks, Stevenson,
and Wolfers (2012, p. 1182), for example, both looked at
evidence from the Gallup World Poll, where respondents
appraised their lives on an 11-point scale. Their assess-
ments ranged from zero (worst possible life) to ten (best
possible life). Future work will no doubt examine much
more ﬁne-grained measures of well-being. That said, we
imagine that some values are difﬁcult to serve through the
9 Psychologists also pursue this quest. Rokeach (1973), an eminent
social psychologist, developed a value survey comprising 18 terminal
values (identifying desirable end-states) and 18 instrumental values
(identifying desirable means to those ends). The former include such
values as a world at peace, family security, and freedom; the latter include
such values as being honest, ambitious, and responsible). Identifying tenbroad human values, Schwartz (2006) has worked hard to assess their
universality.intrinsic values is in the form of principles. A person
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grity, friendship, self-respect, lack of prejudice, and
ntaneity come to mind.
Finally, the word ‘‘satisfaction’’ in our deﬁnition needs
e attention. Satisfaction itself has speciﬁc character-
cs. First, the satisfaction of a particular value refers to
 satisfaction of that value for a particular Business
ticipant. Second, satisfaction admits degrees. Any
son’s particular value may be more or less satisﬁed.
rd, satisfaction itself can be a paradox. There may be
its to satisfaction. More satisfaction may not always be
sfying.10 And fourth, some values are more important
ne person than another. This fact becomes important
en we consider the nature of Collective Value.
lective value
We stated earlier that Collective Value is the agglom-
tion of the Business Participants’ Beneﬁts, net of any
rsive Business outcomes. While the meaning of that
tence is clear, the ability to assess that statement in
ctice is anything but clear. Einstein reportedly said,
t everything that counts can be counted, and not
rything that can be counted counts.’’ Not all Beneﬁts
 be easily appraised, much less combined in a fashion
t allows for easy summation and comparison. The
sfaction of a set of values for an individual person, not
mention a group of people, is impossible to measure
urately on a simple numerical continuum. The chief
blem is incommensurability. For example, how are we
ompare Jack’s utility or happiness to Jill’s (Hausman,
3)?
Note that we use the word agglomeration and not
regation in our deﬁnition here. Both words refer to a
stering but their ultimate coherence differs. Merriam
bster deﬁnes an agglomerate as a mass that is
stered or growing together but not coherent;’’ the
tionary deﬁnes an aggregate as ‘‘a mass or body of units
arts somewhat loosely associated with one another.’’
lective Value represents an agglomeration of beneﬁts,
 an aggregation of beneﬁts. To illustrate, consider the
ue expressed by a human right, say, the right to religious
dom. This is signiﬁcantly different from the value
ressed by beneﬁcence. The former implies a deﬁned
imum standard of behavior relevant to particular
texts over which the agent has no control. Beneﬁcence,
in contrast, implies a duty to go above minimum levels of
prescribed behavior. It allows the duty to be exercised
using considerable agent discretion in self-deﬁned con-
texts.11 A person may value religious freedom and
beneﬁcence but it is not at all clear how we might easily
combine the two into a simple summation of beneﬁt.
We should note that while alluring, the logic of neo-
classical economics fails us when we consider Collective
Value. Neo-classical economics inherited its notion of
value from early 19th century utilitarian philosophers,
developing theories of utility that could be easily
mathematicized (Deane, 1978). While the early notion of
‘‘utils’’ (units of utility) was eventually abandoned in favor
of marginal utility, neo-classicists such as Jevons (1871)
adopted value monism and assumed that economic
activity could be subsumed (i.e., aggregated) under the
banner of a single value, happiness. Not so Collective Value.
Those uncomfortable with value monism need to be
comfortable with the consideration of an agglomeration of
multiple values, and multiple values of differing character.
Alas, there is no Esperanto of values.
Acknowledging severe limitations in our ability to
measure Beneﬁt and Collective Value, we hasten to add
that not all is lost. Some states of value satisfaction are
clearly better than others. Phronesis, or practical wisdom,
tells us that this is so (Aristotle, 1962). If values, or bundles
of values, were truly incommensurable, we could not speak
rationally about some all-things-considered value choices
being better or worse than others. Practical wisdom refers
to the ability to make good ‘‘all-things-considered’’
choices, even in multi-valued contexts. Imagine an
employee, Bob, who reasons about whether to choose
job A or job B. Bob thinks: ‘‘In job A, I have a monthly salary
that is $10 higher than in job B, and I am treated with
disrespect and ignominy. In job B, I have a monthly salary
that is $10 lower than in job A, and I am treated with
respect and dignity. I conclude that job B is a better job
than A.’’ Here Bob compares two things that appear to be
incommensurate at ﬁrst blush, namely, the value of dignity
and the value of money. But Bob reasons well. The
objectivity of Bob’s choice is reﬂected in the fact that a vast
majority of people would reason in the same way if
confronted with this choice. Neo-classical economists view
human beings as rational economic agents, as Homo
Economicus. We view our fellow men and women as
practical reasoners, as Homo Practicus.
Dignity, the dignity threshold, and business success
If business exists to create collective value, it follows
that any theory of business must be normative. A theory
like this must say something about the world we hope to
inhabit. We need to come to terms with how business
creates value and serves society. Recognizing that aversive
outcomes can attend the conduct of business, we also
recognize that some aversive outcomes are simply out of
bounds. Our challenge as a people is to determine just
what behavior is acceptable and what is unacceptable.
In the extreme, the satisfaction of a positive value could even become
lematic. Lewis (2014, pp. 308–309) summed up the phenomenon:
 more I looked into it the more I came to suspect that I was perceiving
iversal law. On cause mieux quand on ne dit pas Causons. The woman
 makes a dog the centre of her life loses, in the end, not only her
an usefulness and dignity but even the proper pleasure of dog-
ing. . . .It is a glorious thing to feel for a moment or two that the whole
ning of the universe is summed up in one woman [or man]—glorious
ong as other duties and pleasures keep tearing you away from her
]. But clear the decks and so arrange your life (it is sometimes
ible) that you will have nothing to do but contemplate her [him], and
t happens? Of course this law has been discovered before, but it will
d re-discovery. It may be stated as follows: every preference of a
ll good to a great, or a partial good to a total good, involves the loss of
small or partial good for which the sacriﬁce was made.’’ Contrariwise,
11inished satisfaction can also become satisfying. For example, patients
come to enjoy the sick role (Mechanic and Volkart, 1961).
This illustration captures the distinction between ‘‘perfect’’ vs.
‘‘imperfect’’ duties that we see in moral theory (Kant, 1996).
T. Donaldson, J.P. Walsh / Research in Organizational Behavior 35 (2015) 181–207192In legal terms, we are looking for a moral ‘‘bright line rule,’’
one that tells us what kind of business activity is to be
strictly forbidden (Schlag, 1985). We suggest that at a
minimum, dignity establishes that decision criterion.
The idea of the dignity of the person has deep roots in
moral philosophy and political action. In moral philosophy,
the very possibility of realizing intrinsic values (and of
moral behavior in general) presumes the inherent worth of
actors capable of such achievements. In different ways,
Utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, and Aristotelianism all
afﬁrm the worth of that actor who uniquely possesses the
capacity to achieve the good and the right, namely, the
moral person. Whether grounded in sacred notions of
the divine or secular notions of agency and autonomy;
every individual has what Rosen (2012, pp. 9, 70) calls ‘‘an
inner transcendental kernel of inalienable value.’’12 Kateb
(2011), Lagon and Arend (2014a), Rosen (2012), and
Waldron (2012) all offer contemporary reviews and their
own ideas about the dignity construct. From them, we
learn that dignity carries an action implication. Endowed
with this inner ‘‘transcendental kernel,’’ every individual is
entitled to respect. Indeed, political life is judged by its
afﬁrmation and protection of human dignity.
In 1776, the U.S. Declaration of Independence famously
began with an assertion that ‘‘all men are created equal.’’
All men – and women – are not only created equal, they
must be treated as equals. They must be accorded their
human dignity. Nine years later, Kant (1959, p. 54) cast this
kind of thinking into his categorical imperative. He argued
that we are always to ‘‘act so that you treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in that of another, always
as an end and never as a means only.’’ This same kind of
thinking was enshrined 163 years later in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Without dissent, the United
Nations General Assembly afﬁrmed a document that
begins with the words:
the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family [; such dignity] is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world.
Germany took this kind of aspirational thinking a step
further the next year. In 1949, they afﬁrmed the
importance of human dignity in Article 1 of the Basic
Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz):
‘‘Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect
it shall be the duty of all state authority.’’13 Theirs is not
just an aspirational statement; it is an enforceable one.14
Thus, human dignity, with roots both in moral theory and
in political action, serves as a central and even sacred
Intrinsic Value to guide Business activity.15
Our understanding of human dignity tells us that our
fellow humans are not to be treated as mere objects or
instruments in a business organization’s production
function. Business participants are to be treated with
respect. As such, the Dignity Threshold establishes a moral
foundation for business activity. The challenge, of course, is
to identify what treatment does or does not clear the
threshold. Since the threshold marks the minimum level of
respect accorded to each Business Participant, the thresh-
old can best be seen as prohibiting indignity. To be sure,
participants can bolster another’s dignity, enhancing
eudaimonia (what the ancients called human ﬂourishing),
but at minimum, Business Participants cannot deny each
other’s fundamental dignity.
Borrowing language from the world of statistics, we can
say that dignity is both a ‘‘categorical’’ and ‘‘continuous’’
idea. When we speak of an indignity, we speak of dignity as
a categorical idea. Hold someone as a slave, for example,
and regardless of how well you might treat that person,
you fully deprive that person of his or her dignity. There is
absolutely no dignity in slavery. Thomas Jefferson may
have fathered six children with Sally Hemings but owning
her as his property until the day he died, he denied her
dignity (Gordon-Reed, 2008). Article 4 of the U.N.
Declaration on Human Rights is unequivocal: ‘‘No one
shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave
trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.’’ The US South in
the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century relied upon the
institution of slavery to support its expansive system of
plantation farming. Even if slavery enhanced the GDP or
PPP of the region, plantation farming cannot be considered
Business Success. Slavery stripped its captive people of
their dignity. The institution of slavery simply does not
pass the Dignity Threshold. That fact cannot be offset at a
personal level by seemingly decent interpersonal treat-
ment. The theory of business offered here directs and
justiﬁes every effort to dismantle a business system that
so violates human dignity.
With eudaimonia in mind, we can see too that dignity
exists on a continuum. The absence of indignity does not
fully capture what is means to be treated with dignity and
to ﬂourish. Consider how we produce and distribute the
food we need to survive and thrive. With the idea of human
dignity front of mind, Article 25 of the U.N. Declaration of
Human Rights states:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate
for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services, and the right to
security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
12 Of course, some deny others their inalienable value. Tyrants, for
example, may deny an entire ethnic group their value and upon doing so,
unleash all manner of horrors upon them (Dean, 2002; Hintjens, 1999).
13 See hhttp://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/eng-
lisch_gg.html#p0015i for look at this law.
14 See Lepsius (2006) for an intriguing case in the Germany’s Federal
Constitutional Court. The court weighed the dignity and lives of
passengers on an airplane commandeered by terrorists against the
dignity and lives of the citizens below whom the terrorists intend to kill
with that plane. The decision surprised many observers. The innocent
15 Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, and Lerner (2000, p. 853) deﬁne a sacred
value as ‘‘any value that a moral community implicitly or explicitly treats
as possessing inﬁnite or transcendental signiﬁcance and that precludes
comparison, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or
secular values.’’ Harrison, Ashforth and Corley (2009, p. 244) point out, ‘‘topeople on the doomed aircraft cannot be killed in an effort to protect the
people on the ground.
sacralize is to render inviolable, such that even contemplating a violation
of the sacred is an act of sacrilege.’’
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livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
Gendered language aside, the key word here is
equate.’’ The World Health Organization tells us that
ealthy diet consists of ‘‘fruits, vegetables, legumes (e.g.
tils, beans), nuts, and whole grains (e.g. unprocessed
ize, millet, oats, wheat, brown rice).’’ Some may rarely
 fruits or say vegetables, but regularly eat all else. Is that
be considered an adequate diet? Others may be
onically short of many of these diverse foodstuffs and
formally labeled as undernourished (the United
ion’s World Food Programme tells us that about one
nine, or 795 million people in the world today are
ernourished).16 A healthy diet can be thought of in
egorical terms (Is a person undernourished or not?) or
continuous terms (What is the quality of a person’s
rition?). What is the difference between an ‘‘inade-
te’’ diet, an ‘‘adequate’’ diet, a ‘‘good’’ diet, and an
cellent’’ diet? That question is born of a ‘‘continuous’’
erstanding of nutrition. To ask whether a person has an
quate diet is to ask ‘‘how low we can go’’ before we rob
erson of his or her dignity; to ask whether a person has
excellent diet is to ask ‘‘how high we can ﬂy’’ as we
brace a person’s dignity.
Some may argue over where to draw a line that
blishes the criterion for proper nutrition – or clothing,
sing, medical care, social services and the right to
urity, or for that matter, the many complex interactions
ween and among the access to nutrition, clothing,
sing, medical care, social services, and security.
uments about measurement and demarcation do not
ermine the ideas we share here. In fact, we welcome
m. We can do worse as a people if we agree to prohibit
ignities in the world and then debate the essence of the
nity we owe each other.
Looking to Article 25 for help in understanding the
ure of dignity, we should point out that we are not
uing here for the corporation or business to cloth the
ed and feed the hungry. Direct responsibilities fall
rly on governments and individuals. Nevertheless, as
ny have argued, business cannot duck responsibilities
espect, protect and sometimes remedy and violations of
ic human rights (Donaldson, 1989, pp. 65–94; Ruggie,
8).
Writing about the nature of society, Margalit (1996, pp.
11) observed, ‘‘A society is decent if its institutions do
 act in ways that give the people under their authority
nd reasons to consider themselves humiliated.’’
anding on Margalit’s notion, we would say, ‘‘Business
ecent if its institutions do not act in ways that give the
ple under their authority sound reasons to think their
erent worth has been denied.’’ Beyond that, if business
o be considered successful, collective value must be
imized, enhanced as much as possible. That optimiza-
 process must include the recognition of participants’
nity. Rosen (2012, p. 157) got it right when he said,
‘‘In failing to respect the humanity of others we actually
undermine humanity in ourselves.’’17
Next, we consider a more complex contemporary
business situation that illustrates how purely economic
notions of business success can fail us.
Collective value in the world of coffee
Let us consider a stylized, but not unimaginable case.
Consider a simpliﬁed value chain for the production of
coffee, one that includes the relationships among the
farmer, the roaster, and the retailer [see Ponte (2002) for a
more complete examination of coffee’s value chain]. In this
world, the farmer grows the coffee beans; he or she then
sells them to the roaster, who in turn, sells the roasted
beans to the retailer. The retailer, of course, sells the
beverage to the consumer. For purposes of simplicity, we
assume a world comprised of one farmer, one roaster, and
one retailer.
In this simple value chain, we clearly ﬁnd activity that
ﬁts our deﬁnition of business activity, namely, cooperation
involving the production, exchange, and distribution of
goods and services (albeit one without a consideration of
the government and not-for-proﬁt sector). How do we
assess Collective Value here? We know that Collective
Value in the value chain equals the agglomeration of the
Business Participants’ beneﬁts [i.e., the beneﬁts that accrue
to the farmer, the roaster and the retailer], net of any
aversive business outcomes. Because Beneﬁts equal the
contributions made to the satisfaction of a Business
Participant’s Positive and Intrinsic Values, it follows that
we must also assess the satisfaction of their values.
Let us consider ﬁrst Intrinsic Values in agglomerating
the satisfaction of these participants’ values. Again,
Intrinsic Values can be divided into two types: good-
related and principle-related. For the purposes of simplici-
ty, we identify only one good-related value here, health,
and only one principle-related value, promise keeping.18
We assume that both of these intrinsic values are positive
values for the farmer, roaster, and retailer. In agglomerat-
ing the satisfaction of their values, next consider non-
intrinsic values. For simplicity’s sake, we identify only
three non-intrinsic values. Each participant has his or her
own idiosyncratic value: the farmer wants to build his or
her businesses, the roaster wants to better educate his or
her children, and the retailer wants to improve his or her
means of personal transportation.
We will consider three possible conﬁgurations of
Collective Value: Optimized Collective Value (or Business
See hhttp://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs394/en/i and
17 It is not always easy to recognize another’s dignity. Molinsky and
Margolis (2005), for example, alerted us to the challenge of administering
a ‘‘necessary evil’’ to another. They pointed out that there are times when
‘‘an individual causes emotional or physical harm to another human
being in the service of achieving some perceived greater good or purpose’’
(p. 247). Still, Margolis and Molinsky (2008, p. 858) showed us that these
evils can be administered with ‘‘respect, dignity, empathy, and concern.’’
18 While human dignity is the paramount intrinsic value in our work,
promise keeping deserves special treatment too. Promises seal contracts,
a sine qua non for Business activity. It is no surprise to see that agencyps://www.wfp.org/hunger/statsi for links to the work of the WHO
 the WFP.
theory and transaction cost economics both turn on the concept of
contract.
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of Advantage. For purposes of simplicity, we assume that
the values at stake here are either fully satisﬁed or not
satisﬁed. A plus sign expresses the satisfaction of a given
value; a negative sign expresses the failure to satisfy a
given value (we do not attempt to weigh the different
values or to assign a rank ordering here).
First, imagine a simple conﬁguration of Business
Success (i.e., proximity to optimized Collective Value). In
this conﬁguration, the business activities of the value chain
satisfy all intrinsic and selected non-intrinsic values for
the farmer, roaster, and retailer (see Table 1). Everyone
receives enough from their business activities to ensure
their adequate health. Moreover, promises among the
three are kept (honoring their business contracts and
quality commitments). Next, the non-intrinsic values are
satisﬁed, one for each of the Business Participants. The
farmer earns enough money to buy more land, the roaster
is able to send his or her children to private school, and the
retailer is able to purchase a modest automobile, say a Kia
Rio. Each row expresses the Beneﬁt to each participant. The
matrix itself represents the agglomeration of the individ-
ual beneﬁts, the Collective Value of Business in this stylized
world of business.
Imagine next a different state, one called Unsavory
Business Practices (see Table 2). Here the intrinsic value of
promise keeping is not satisﬁed but the intrinsic value of
health is satisﬁed. Suppose, for example, that despite
persistent lying and broken commitments all around, the
productive capacity of the value chain is sufﬁcient to
satisfy all other values, including the participants’ health.
Despite productive abundance, something is missing in
this world of business. The Collective Value matrix is not
optimized. Most people prefer to live in a world of kept
promises. This inferiority of this ‘‘all things considered’’
world of business, one reﬂecting a violation of intrinsic
values, is difﬁcult to depict accurately using traditional
economic methods. ‘‘Objective values,’’ at the very mini-
mum, constitute constraints on the ‘‘skeletal view of
rationality espoused by economists’’ (Hausman & McPher-
son, 1993, p. 683). Deontological concepts that reference
commitments and obligations are needed; and these can
conﬂict with economic concepts of well-being. ‘‘Some
types of agency roles, e.g., those related to fulﬁlling
obligations,’’ writes Sen (1985, p. 187), ‘‘can quite possibly
have a negative impact on the person’s well-being.’’
Finally, let us consider a conﬁguration called the
Exploitation of Advantage (see Table 3). Here one actor’s
pursuit of an idiosyncratic value undermines another
actor’s fundamental intrinsic value and his or her
claims most of the value simply because he or she can.
Intrinsic Values met, he or she is also able to grandly satisfy
his or her idiosyncratic value by purchasing a conspicu-
ously luxurious mode of transportation. The roaster’s place
in the value chain is secure; he or she neither gains nor
loses by the change of affairs. The farmer, however, now
lives in a world of life-threatening poverty. His or her
intrinsic value of health is no longer satisﬁed as low prices
create a life of desperate poverty. He or she then moves to
supplement the coffee crop with opium or khat in a
desperate effort to earn enough money to eat (Khat tops
coffee for Ethiopia farmers, 2014; Myanmar returns to
what sells: Heroin, 2015). Such an imagined world may not
be too far removed from today’s actual world of coffee
production and consumption (Haight, 2011; Ponte, 2002;
Valkila, Haaparanta, & Niemi, 2010). The acclaimed
2006 documentary ﬁlm entitled ‘‘Black Gold’’ captures
something of this life.19
Of course, this simple three-actor model does not
account for the problem of externalities. That said, it is easy
enough to illustrate the externality problem in this kind of
world. All we need to do is play out the success story
pictured in Table 1. Problems arise when farmers, moving
to satisfy consumer demand, move their now industrial-
based farming practices from the shade to the sun. Nearly
twenty years ago, Perfecto, Rice, Greenberg and van der
Voort (1996, p. 607) warned of a ‘‘severe loss of
biodiversity’’ if coffee farmers continued to move their
operations into the sunshine. Jha et al. (2014) recently told
us that in a world where we now drink more than
400 billion cups of coffee annually, perhaps only a quarter
of the world’s coffee is grown traditionally, in the shade.
They chronicle the deleterious effects of sun-grown coffee
practices on the likes of pollination, pest control, carbon
sequestration, soil quality, erosion control, and watershed
management. Grim as the situation is, Tscharntke et al.
(2011) do offer a host of ideas to reverse the situation.
Nevertheless, unless checked, ‘‘successful’’ coffee farming
can create problems for us all.
As the above analyses show, Business Success names a
concept richer than one focusing solely on the mere
aggregation of economic wealth. True business success
should be able to show, as this model does, why the ﬁrst
conﬁguration is superior to the other two (albeit with a
clear eye on how that success might affect the natural
environment in the years ahead). Our conception of
business merges values that are not expressly contem-
plated in economic theory with ones that are. Simple
Table 1
Business success: the participants’ intrinsic and idiosyncratic values are satisﬁed.
Enterprise Intrinsic
value 1—Health
Intrinsic
value 2—Promise
keeping
Positive
value 1—Build
a business
Positive
value 2—Better
educate our children
Positive
value 3—Improve
personal transportation
Coffee farmer + + Buys more land (+)
Coffee roaster + + Pays private school tuition (+)
Coffee retailer + + Buys a Kia Rio (+)19 See hhttp://blackgoldmovie.com/i for a link to the movie.idiosyncratic value. Imagine a world where the retailer
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sonal preference (e.g., property and ﬁnancial well-
ng) but not one’s intrinsic values (e.g., human dignity
 promise keeping). To be sure, economic thinking does
 expressly dismiss such values; the values simply fall
side the circumscribed domain of economic theory. As
del (2012, 2013) recently observed, a preoccupation
h a narrow set of values will have the cumulative effect
crowding out consideration of the kinds of intrinsic
ues we consider here.
lications
 purpose, accountability, control, and success of business
We opened this work by chronicling the normative
ssure on ﬁrms to serve as agents of world beneﬁt. Those
o encourage businesses to change (e.g., the United
ions and the Aspen Institute) are not marked by a lack
conomic sophistication but rather by a quest to honor
an dignity when we produce, exchange, and distribute
 goods and services. This quest inspired our attempt to
elop a theory of business.
To be sure, our theory is a normative one. Looking to
culate the role that business plays in creating a good
iety, it cannot be otherwise. Freeman (1994) is correct.
 separation thesis is false. Any attempt to separate
iness activity from values is akin to trying to separate a
e from its shape. The same is true of business. It is
ossible to jettison values from a comprehensive
sideration of business practice. Business activity
ays reveals the values that shape it. Those values are
ealed in any consideration of the purpose, accountabil-
 control, and success of business. As such, we offer the
owing four propositions as corollaries to a theory of
iness:
1: The purpose of business is to optimize collective
alue.
 P2: Business is accountable to those who affect and are
affected by its activities, those in the present, past, and
future.
 P3: Business control must prohibit any assault on
participants’ dignity.
 P4: Optimized collective value is the mark of business
success.
Three noteworthy features mark these propositions.
First, we need to consider the idea of equiﬁnality. There are
many paths to business success. Second, the idea that
business is accountable to business participants in the past
and future, as well as to those in the present, is worthy of
discussion. And ﬁnally, we need to say a word about
optimization in this context.
Equiﬁnality
One important implication of these propositions is that
not all business ﬁrms need to be alike. In fact, a variety of
organizations will likely achieve collective value better
than a set of ﬁrms marked by cookie–cutter similarity.
Consider an analogy. A coordinated team of carpenters,
electricians, plumbers, masons and the like will build a
better home than any one group will build on its own (or
even one made by a Jack-of-all-trades artisan). And of
course, it takes more than craftspeople to build a building.
Bankers, lawyers and insurance specialists, for example,
enable this work too. The second implication is that the
work of business needs to be coordinated. To be sure,
markets facilitate coordination but those markets them-
selves need to be developed and sustained. Government
and the not-for-proﬁt sector play crucial roles in business
too. In addition to providing the infrastructure for efﬁcient
and effective contracting among the parties, government
ensures the quality of building materials, the well-being of
the natural environment, the safety of the builders, and so
much more. The not-for-proﬁt sector works to both ensure
that standards and safeguards of all kinds are deﬁned and
met, often before any government is involved (e.g., the
National Fire Protection Association), and to make sure
le 2
optimal collective value: unsavory business practices (while one of participants’ intrinsic values and all of their idiosyncratic values are met, one
insic value is violated).
terprise Intrinsic
value 1—Health
Intrinsic
value 2—Promise
keeping
Positive
value 1—Build
a business
Positive
value 2—Better
educate our children
Positive
value 3—Improve
personal transportation
ffee farmer + Lying and broken promises () Buys more land (+)
ffee roaster + Lying and broken promises () Pays private school
tuition (+)
ffee retailer + Lying and broken promises () Buys a Kia Rio (+)
le 3
loitation of advantage: one participant’s pursuit of an idiosyncratic value undermines another’s fundamental intrinsic and idiosyncratic value.
terprise Intrinsic
value 1—Health
Intrinsic
value 2—Promise
keeping
Positive
value 1—Build
a business
Positive
value 2—Better
educate our children
Positive
value 3—Improve
personal transportation
ffee farmer Living in poverty () + Now grows
narcotics ()
ffee roaster + + Pays private school
tuition (+)
ffee retailer + + Buys a Cadillac Escalade (+)
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Humanity). Any single business ﬁrm always sits in a
broader ecology of business activity. The amazing, and
nearly inﬁnite, variety of ﬁrms and coordination schemes
available for achieving Business Success opens the door to
equiﬁnality. Many roads can lead to the same destination.
Accountability to the past and future, as well as to the present
Business participants are accountable not just to their
contemporaries but to their ancestors and descendants
too. That statement might strike some as very expansive, if
not too expansive. To assert that business is to be
accountable to those living who affect and are affected
by its activity should pass without remark. To be sure,
people read Freeman’s (1984, p. 46) deﬁnition of a
stakeholder (‘‘any group or individual who can affect or
is affected by the achievement of the activities of an
organization’’) and wonder whether a ﬁrm should really
view a competitor or even a terrorist as a stakeholder
(Phillips, 2003). Still, no one questions Freeman’s implicit
focus on the living.
A move to consider the unborn might raise an eyebrow
at ﬁrst blush, but with some reﬂection, we see that people
do accept the idea. After all, future thinking is baked
into our everyday conceptions of management. Jacques
(1986), for example, noted that a ﬁrm’s senior leaders
typically look twenty to ﬁfty years into the future when
they make their decisions. More recently, Elkington
(1998, p. 55) famously deﬁned sustainability as ‘‘meeting
the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs‘‘.
Legacy matters. Indeed, a number of social psychologists
are working today to understand just how people make
forward-looking intergeneration resource allocation
decisions (Tost, Wade-Benzoni, & Johnson, 2015; Wade-
Benzoni, 2002; Wade-Benzoni, Hernandez, Medvec, &
Messick, 2008; Wade-Benzoni, Sondak, & Galinsky, 2010).
However, people may not think about their predeces-
sors’ legacies. Do we owe anything to those who came
before us? We say ‘‘yes.’’ The humility that comes from an
understanding of history does us good. Fundamentally, we
need to appreciate that we inherit the world when we are
born. We also would do well to appreciate that in time, our
lives will be history too. Our legacy should be to leave the
world better than we found it. In short, we should work to
make our ancestors proud. In this spirit, Wade-Benzoni
(2002, p. 1014) introduced us to the idea of intergenera-
tional reciprocity. She argued, ‘‘people can pass on beneﬁts
(or burdens) to future generations as a matter of
retrospective obligation (or retaliation) for the good (or
bad) received from past generations’’ (p. 1014). Note that
with a focus on all that is received (the good and the bad in
her terms) – this is a descriptive theoretical idea.
Normatively, we would do well to learn from the bad
we inherit but resist the temptation to settle scores. All too
often, retribution creates never-ending cycles of violence
(Minow, 2002). It is much better to build on the good than
it is to be caught up in the bad.
Mkhize (2004) tells us that many in Africa see
themselves as interdependently linked to the past. People
Such a view is less common in the global North. South or
North, business leaders the world over would do well to
consider how their decisions do – or do not – honor their
ancestors’ positive contributions to their lives.20 Stewards
for the world in our time here, we should work to honor
our grandparents’ contributions in the same way that we
hope our grandchildren will work to honor ours. Taking
stock of our recent ﬁnancial crisis, Bruce Springsteen
(Stewart, 2012, p. 45) lambasted those without such a
sensibility:
This is what the guys at Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers forgot. They forgot that they are a part of a
continuum of history, and it’s not about the fucking
buck that you make today at whoever’s fucking
expense. If there’s not a sense of continuity, a sense
of some sort of communal obligation and responsibility,
a sense of a future involved in what you’re doing, and a
sense of being beholden to the past, you end up being
one callow, greedy motherfucker, just trying to get all
you can get.
Optimization
We recognize that some may question our idea that
optimized collective value is the mark of business success.
They might argue that just as economists problematically
assumed (for decades) that humans are perfectly rational
and work to optimize their economic ambitions, we might
have embraced a similarly problematic idea. Adopting the
idea of optimization as we do, we risk a reader dismissing
our ideas of success as fantasy. Perhaps we should follow
Simon’s (1945/1997) lead and develop an idea akin to his
notion of satisﬁcing. Perhaps we should develop a
threshold notion of ‘‘satisfactory collective value’’ and
use it instead to deﬁne business success. There is much to
be said about that kind of a well-meaning reaction. At base,
however, we think it is a mistake to introduce a ‘‘good
enough ‘‘criterion to any consideration of business success.
Merriam Webster tells us that optimization is ‘‘an act,
process, or methodology of making something (as a design,
system, or decision) as fully perfect, functional, or effective
as possible.’’ We do well to strive for business success that
is as fully perfect, functional, or effective as possible. Why
should we settle for anything less?
Remember that Herbert Simon’s problem is not our
problem. Simon (1978, p. 368) addressed the problem
facing (what he called in his Nobel Prize acceptance
speech) the ‘‘information processing system called Man.’’
He investigated how individuals with limited information
processing capabilities make decisions and solve problems
in the face of incredible complexity and uncertainty. Faced
with cognitive limitations, he argued that individuals
20 A friendly reviewer asked if by turning to African society for
inspiration, we risk dismissal by those who think ‘‘pre-modern’’ societies
have little to teach us. We hold no such prejudice. Indeed, we are wary of
those in the global north who think they are somehow more modern than
those in the global south. History does not look kindly on such a view. To
put it mildly, the people of the Congo, for example, were not impressed bythe ‘‘modern ways’’ shown them by the Belgians at the turn of the last
century (Hochschild, 1998).there strive to honor the best of their ancestors’ legacies.
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ing ‘‘ways of action that are sufﬁcient unto the day’’
78, p. 368). We are not searching for a descriptive
ory of sufﬁcient business behavior here. Rather, we are
rching for a normative theory of business that will
ble us to ﬂourish as a species in the world. We owe it to
 ancestors, ourselves, and to our descendants to strive
optimized collective value. Work for anything less and
 will very likely get it.
are a fallacy of division
The fallacy of division is the converse of the fallacy of
position. We commit it when we imagine that the
perties of a whole are fully transferable to its parts.
alling Hansen’s (2015, p. 5) example, one cannot
erve an excellent investigative team and infer that
h member of the team is an excellent researcher. As
kheim (1895/1966, p. 4) pointed out years ago in his
ussion of social facts, ‘‘there are ways of acting,
king and feeling that present the noteworthy property
xisting outside the individual consciousness.’’ A team
 properties that go beyond its membership, just as
iness has properties that differ from the ﬁrms that help
prise it.
The 2004 United States presidential election offers us a
sic example of a division fallacy. While John Kerry won
 popular vote in 9 of the country’s 11 wealthiest states
 George Bush won the 15 poorest states, we cannot
clude that rich people voted for Kerry and poor people
ed for Bush. In fact, 62% of voters with annual incomes
r $200,000 voted for Bush and 64% of voters with
ual income less than $15,000 voted for Kerry (Gelman,
0). The fallacy here is to assume that the action of a
althy state (the whole) can easily tell us about the
avior of the individuals in the state (the parts).
ordingly, we need to consider carefully what a theory
usiness implies for any single business ﬁrm. Instead of
wing inferences directly from our broader theory of
iness to any single ﬁrm, we should ask whether what is
e at the level of business as a whole is compatible with
at is true at the level of the ﬁrm. A number of open
stions about such compatibility emerge when we
tapose a theory of business with a theory of the ﬁrm.
Table 4 brieﬂy contrasts the two perspectives and then
raises a series of open questions for us to consider.
These questions open a new door to appraising and
leading ﬁrms. They may also help to explain the uneasiness
we catalogued at the start of this paper. Consider, for
example, the beleaguered straw man, speciﬁcally the idea
that ﬁrms are to reduce their transaction costs. Despite its
critics (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996), some scholars took the
occasion of Oliver Williamson’s 2009 Nobel Prize an-
nouncement to reﬂect on the theory’s contribution to the
theory and practice of management (Teece, 2010), strate-
gic management (Nickerson, 2010), international business
(Hennart, 2010), and marketing (John & Reve, 2010). Many
argue that transaction cost theory has yielded helpful
insights to improve the efﬁciency of production and
exchange and, in turn, generate collective value. However,
the theory’s inability to address such issues as the
obligation of the banking industry to avoid the systemic
ﬁnancial risks that can imperil the industry and society
alike should surprise no one.
To be sure, the fact that these issues fall outside the
reach of the transaction cost theory is not a failing of
the theory per se. As Alfred North Whitehead (1978, p. 9)
once noted, ‘‘The ﬁeld of a special science is conﬁned to
one genus of facts, in the sense that no statements are
made respecting facts which lie outside that genus.’’ The
relevant theory for addressing such a concern is not
transaction cost economics but rather a theory of
business. Bank executives, for example, should ask,
‘‘Because the integrity of the ﬁnancial environment is
crucial for optimizing collective value, has our bank
deﬁned its purpose, understood its accountability, and
designed its control systems in such a way that our
activities are compatible with maintaining the integrity of
the ﬁnancial system?’’ Depending on circumstance, the
same executives might follow with corollary questions,
such as, ‘‘Might our need for collective value require a new
approach for understanding competition and cooperation
in our industry? Should we, for example, initiate industry-
level conversations and even collaborations on how best
to avoid systemic risk and protect the integrity of the
global ﬁnancial system?’’ After all, self-regulation is not
unknown in the corporate world (Hauﬂer, 2001). With this
framing and example as backdrop, we will close our paper
le 4
n questions: contrasting a theory of business with a theory of the ﬁrm.
Theory of business Neo-classical theories
of the ﬁrm
Open questions for corporate leaders
rpose Optimize collective value Maximize ﬁrm value Is our corporation’s purpose compatible with Business
achieving Optimized Collective Value for all Business
Participants?
countability To all Business Participants To the law and to the
ﬁrm’s owners
Is our form of corporate accountability compatible with
Business achieving Optimized Collective Value for all
Business Participants?
ntrol Prohibit assaults on
participants’ dignity
Guard against self-seeking
with guile
Is our form of corporate control compatible with Business
achieving Optimized Collective Value for all Business
Participants?
ccess Optimized collective value Shareholder wealth creation Is the form of our corporation’s success compatible with
Business achieving Optimized Collective Value for allBusiness Participants?
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in the years ahead.
Purpose
What is the purpose of a ﬁrm when the purpose of
business is to optimize collective value? One might be
tempted to reason that every ﬁrm must simply work to
optimize collective value. This view, however, would
evidence another instance of the division fallacy. Consider
the human heart. The purpose of the heart is to pump
blood. However, it is important to note that different parts
of the heart, the ventricles, valves, septum, aorta and more,
have their own discrete purposes. Now consider business.
Just as the septum is a part of the heart that pumps blood, a
ﬁrm is a part of the ecology of business that creates
collective value. Few ﬁrms may be entirely focused on
creating collective value. And that is ﬁne. Still, they are not
exempt from playing some role in that effort. After all, a
ﬁrm is a moral entity that works in and for society. As such,
a ﬁrm holds two interrelated purposes: ﬁrst, a focal
purpose, a purpose that reﬂects its work in society and
second, a contextual purpose, a purpose that reﬂects its
work for society.
The ﬁrm’s focal purpose is familiar to every business
student. Fail to provide customers with a high quality good
or service at a competitive, proﬁt-making price and the
ﬁrm may well go out of business. Fail to reach those
customers with an effective sales and marketing campaign,
raise and manage capital, recruit and manage human
resources, and efﬁciently manage their operations and the
ﬁrm may go out of business. And to be sure, managers
cannot ignore those who hold the ﬁrm’s residual claims,
those who hold common stock. The neoclassical econo-
mists persuasively point out that these risk-bearing
shareholders are the ones most interested in maximizing
the value of the entire corporation. Shareholders can keep
managers ever attentive to creating sustained competitive
advantage.
All of that said, the ﬁrm’s contextual purpose cannot be
ignored. A ﬁrm is a human creation, one designed by
humans and for humans. At a minimum, all of its activities
must clear the Dignity Threshold. No ﬁrm should disre-
spect the inherent worth, the dignity, of its many business
participants. It must treat each one with respect. Moreover,
no ﬁrm should forget that the ﬁnal justiﬁcation of its
activities from a social perspective lies in its contribution
to collective value.
Many ﬁrms are experimenting with aligning focal and
contextual purposes in explicit ways. Indeed, such
dedicated dual-purpose experimentation marks our age.
Some ﬁrms, obeying the law, seek to maximize their
shareholder’s return. No one can complain about such
ﬁrms if they clear the Dignity Threshold and recognize
their broader purpose in society. Others, however, seek to
make a more direct social impact as they conduct their
business. Looking at what Conley and Williams (2005)
called the ‘‘corporate social responsibility movement,’’ we
increasingly see ﬁrms making social investments of the
kind Koﬁ Annan (2001) sought almost ﬁfteen years ago.
Others ﬁrms, LinkedIn for example, have a mission infused
world’s professionals to make them more productive and
successful’’; their purpose is a lofty one – to ‘‘creat(e)
economic opportunity for every member of the global
workforce.’’21 Others, B Corporations, submit themselves
to outside appraisal and are formally certiﬁed as commit-
ted to transparent social and environmental performance
(as they do their business). Nearly 1400 B Corps in
41 countries have been so certiﬁed as of this writing.22 And
still others, social enterprises, commit themselves to social
and economic performance but do so absent third party
certiﬁcation (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Ebrahim, Battilana,
& Mair, 2014).
Perhaps surprisingly, those steeped in neo-classical
economics are not hostile to such experimentation. The
noted legal scholars Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), for
example, addressed this issue directly. All they request is
transparency:
What is the goal of the corporation? Is it proﬁt, and for
whom? Is there anything wrong with company charity?
Should corporations try to maximize proﬁt over the
long run or short run? Our response to such questions
is: who cares? If the New York Times is formed to publish
a newspaper ﬁrst and make a proﬁt second, no one
should be allowed to object. Those who came in at the
beginning consented, and those who came later bought
stock the price of which reﬂected the corporation’s
tempered commitment to a proﬁt objective. . . .one
thing that cannot survive is systematic efforts to fool
participants (pp. 35–37).
Just as a ﬁrm ought not to fool its shareholders, it ought
not to fool any of its business participants. It is incumbent
on a ﬁrm to be clear about it purpose and its effects on
others. It is to be accountable to every business participant.
Accountability
We argued earlier that Business Participants must be
accountable to others, even those from the past and in the
future. Complex as that assertion may be, business leaders
face another accountability challenge. Responsible for a set
of processes and practices that quite clearly affect life on
the planet, we need to consider other life on the planet.
Humans share the earth with other animals, plants, and
yes, the physical planet itself. Is business accountable to
anyone or anything besides our human beings? We say
yes. While we deﬁned dignity in terms of the inherent
worth of persons, we now wonder if non-human animals
manifest any kind of dignity. Indeed, might other parts of
the biosphere, forests, grasslands and coral reefs, possess
their own singular form of inherent worth? We think the
answer to both questions is yes, although we acknowledge
the difﬁculty of justifying this ‘‘yes.’’ A full justiﬁcation lies
beyond this paper’s reach.
Still, take the animal kingdom. To be sure, animals may
lack the ability to reason in complex ways; their lives are
21 See hhttps://www.linkedin.com/about-us?trk=hb_ft_abouti for a look
at their mission and hhttps://linkedinforgood.linkedin.com/i for a look at
their purpose.
22 See hhttps://www.bcorporation.net/i for a current ﬁgure.with social purpose. Their mission is to ‘‘connect the
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ood and survival than humans lives are. The theme of
 inferiority of animals to humans is ubiquitous in
tory. Genesis portrays God as saying, ‘‘Have dominion
r the ﬁsh of the sea, the birds of the air, and all the living
gs that crawl on the earth.’’ While these crawling living
gs may have simple interests, they nonetheless do
e interests. And the satisfaction or denial of these
rests, just as in the case of humans, creates both
eﬁts and harms. Peter Singer, the philosopher best
wn for championing the rights of animals writes, ‘‘The
ument for extending the principle of equality beyond
 own species is simple. It amounts to no more than a
r understanding of the principle of equal consideration
nterests’’ (Singer, 2011, p. 49). In his sweeping history of
 human species, Harari (2015, p. 92) suggests that we
uld be ashamed by how we have handled our
ponsibility to the animal kingdom: ‘‘Ten thousand
rs ago, not more than a few million sheep, cattle, goats,
rs and chickens lived in restricted Afro-Asian niches.
ay the world contains about a billion sheep, a billion
s, more than a billion cattle, and more than 25 billion
ckens. . . .domesticated chickens and cattle may well be
evolutionary success story, but they are also among the
st miserable creatures that ever lived. The domestica-
 of animals was founded on a series of brutal practices
t only became crueler with the passing of the
turies.’’23
Hence, one might apply a version of the Dignity
eshold to the treatment of animals based on the simple
logy between human and animal interests Indeed,
ndine and Deesing (2008) show us how we can treat
mals with dignity, even as we raise them to eat.
No shortage of critics, prophets, and problem solvers
rk to alert us humans to our treatment of the earth itself.
nded in 1974, the Worldwatch Institute has been
lishing its inﬂuential State of the World reports
ually since 1984. Born in 2000 at Koﬁ Annan’s urging,
 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment project works with
ntists the world over to assess changes in our
systems and their effects on human well-being. They
 imagine solutions to our problems. Recently, Pope
ncis added his voice of concern, calling the world to
ion with the encyclical letter, Laudato Si’.24
While talk of business’ triple bottom line (Elkington,
8) may alert us to our responsibilities for life on the
net (and the planet itself), we do not yet know how to
igh or balance these many interests as we do business. Is
re a ‘‘life-principle’’ that renders non-human life on the
net ‘‘morally considerable’’ (Goodpaster, 1978, p. 320)?
igious conviction notwithstanding, it is clear that we
ans do have dominion over the earth. As Sanderson,
Jaiteh, Levy, Redford, Wannebo and Woolmer (2002, p.
902) pointed out, ‘‘The global extent of the human
footprint suggests that humans are stewards of nature,
whether we like it or not.’’ In this same vein, Hoffman and
Jennings (2015, p. 10) recently took stock of our new
‘‘Anthropocene Era’’; they concluded, ‘‘humans are now a
primary operating element in the Earth’s ecosystems.’’ We
agree with Kateb (2011, p. 116), ‘‘We must abandon the
human prejudice that animals and the rest of nature exist
solely for human use.’’ Business Participants and business
scholars alike need to come to terms with this broad
accountability challenge.
Control
Our fundamental criterion for the control of Business is
simple. At a minimum, we are to guard against any assault
on a business participant’s dignity. At our best, we strive to
enhance the participant’s dignity. This assurance of dignity
applies to humans, and just maybe to other life on the
planet, if not the planet itself. The implementation
challenges are threefold: (1) Who is to effect this control?
(2) Where will it happen? and (3) How will it happen?
The locus of control. Our understanding of the control of a
single corporation gives us some purchase to understand
how we might broadly control business. Moving from the
micro to the macro, we can look to individuals in
organizations to exhibit moral character and self-control
(Cohen & Morse, 2014; Crossan, Mazutis, Seijts, & Gandz,
2013). Engaged in a process of ‘‘mutual monitoring’’ within
a company, these individuals can hold each other to high
standards (Fama & Jensen, 1983). We have already noted
that ﬁrms may regulate their own behavior (Hauﬂer,
2001). Of course, a ﬁrm’s board of directors and product
market competition itself also serve to keep a company
operating efﬁciently and effectively. But if the corpor-
ation’s board cannot control the ﬁrm’s management
(Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005) and if the market is uncompeti-
tive (Giroud & Miller, 2011), then the market for corporate
control serves as a bulwark against control failures
(Manne, 1965).25 Beyond that, ﬁrms are subject to activist
and social movement pressure (King & Pearce, 2010). And
of course, corporations are ultimately subject to govern-
ment control. As Wickersham (1918, p. 206) pointed out
over one hundred years ago, ‘‘No state can long endure,
which does not preserve its supremacy over private
combinations, whether in the garb of corporations, or
otherwise.’’ Well-functioning governments are to weigh
society’s competing interests and write laws to set wage
ﬂoors, product liability standards, environmental health
and safety standards, rules of competition, and more.
Governments must have a clear eye on collective value and
work to ensure its optimization.
One can imagine a world where corporations with
a new understanding of their role in the world exertIn a similar vein, Singer (2009) reviews what he calls (on p. 222) our
age’’ treatment of animals from the pre-Christian period to today. See
pter 5 for the review.
See hhttp://www.worldwatch.org/missioni and hhttp://www.millen-
assessment.org/en/About.htmli for an introduction to these orga-
tions’ work and their reports. Pope Francis’ encyclical can be read
25 The market for corporate control, sometimes known as the takeover
market, refers to a practice where outside managers compete for the: hhttp://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/docu-
ts/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.htmli
opportunity to better lead a ﬁrm that they consider to be undervalued
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
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movements, and government oversight to honor the
dignity of business participants and create collective
value. Calling attention to fundamental changes in the
world of business and the corporation’s changing role in
that changing world, Scherer and Palazzo (2007, 2011)
would likely agree. But if companies, government and
civil society alike comprise business activity, then we
also need to go further and discern how best to control
government and the not-for-proﬁt sector . . . and then
consider how the three commingle to create the good
society. There is much to be done. Along the way, we also
need to consider the second big question, ‘‘What
constitutes society?’’
One society or many. We might think of society in term of
nations. Perhaps the United States itself constitutes a
‘‘society.’’26 Conducted every ﬁve years, the US Census
Bureau counted 5.7 million ﬁrms and 90,056 local
government entities in 2012 (in addition to the Federal
government and the 50 state governments). The Internal
Revenue Service counted over 1.44 million tax-exempt
organizations in that year too.27 Perhaps we can consider
society to be the 314 million Americans who live with
those 5.7 million ﬁrms, 1.4 million not-for-proﬁt orga-
nizations, and over 90,000 government entities.28 But then
again, the United States is just one of the 193 member
states in the United Nations. Are there 193 societies in the
world? Maybe; maybe not. We also need to account for
globalization, for the fact that the world is world is ‘‘ﬂatter’’
than it has ever been (Friedman, 2007).
The current generation has borne witness to what
Feenstra (1998) calls the integration of trade and
disintegration of production in our global economy.
Connections are made routinely between ﬁrms in markets
and increasingly within ﬁrms as they operate across nation
states. For example, the United Nations (UNCTAD, 2009)
tells us that approximately 82,000 transnational corpora-
tions spanned the world with their 810,000 afﬁliate
organizations just a few years ago. In many ways, the
idea that a nation’s borders bind society seems outdated.
Perhaps it is best to consider business as it works in and for
humanity.
Let us say that there are about 200 countries in the
world (Greenland, Kosovo, and Taiwan, for example, are
not members of the UN but each is seen by many as a
country; Palestine and the Holy See are currently UN non-
member states). Therefore, humanity might comprise the
7.3 billion people who live in a world of approximately
200 independent states.29 What is the scale of business
activity if we think in these terms? These 200 national
governments and their hundreds of thousands of smaller
state and local government entities monitor and control
business activity in their borders. Can we estimate how
many companies operate within these borders? This is a
difﬁcult assignment but still, we do have some idea. Dun &
Bradstreet (2015), for example, currently has data in hand
on 134,968,036 companies (from 235 countries). How
many not-for-proﬁts (NFPs) are there in the world? We do
not know. With 1.44 million NFPs serving 314 million
Americans, that 1:218 ratio, suggests that we might see
33 million NFPs in the world. On the other hand, the United
Kingdom counted 161,266 voluntary organizations within
its borders in 2014. With a population of over 63.5 million,
that 1:394 ratio, suggests that there might be 18.3 million
NFPs in the world. Consider South Africa. There are 139,482
non-proﬁt organizations in their country today. A 1:384
ratio suggests that there might be 19 million NFPs in the
world.30 Having said that, let’s imagine that these three
countries are outliers. Moreover, we know that many of
these NFPs operate on a global scale. Maybe there are far
fewer NFPs in the world. But even if the ratio was 1:3840,
we would still see 1.9 million NFPs. All we know for sure is
that the number is huge and that the worldwide business,
government and civil society relationships are extremely
complex.
A theory of the ﬁrm does not really help us understand,
much less control business at this level of analysis. Win or
lose the stockholder vs. stakeholder debate, the debate
itself seems to be off point. We need a theory of business
and business success if we are to understand and guide
business activity. Even in a world of 7.3 billion people, the
control tenets of a theory of business may help us more
than we might imagine. If every business participant is
worthy of dignity, then we have a principle that can orient
the governance and control of business activity the world
over. Each decision maker should honor the dignity of
those who affect and are affected by that decision maker’s
work. Diffuse that simple principle worldwide and the
world of business will change dramatically.
Note that this attention to each decision maker’s
conduct is quite different from the current focus on radical
transparency (Tapscott & Ticoll, 2003). To be sure,
complete information can help external monitor’s better
control business. And yes, the act of compiling and
preparing that information for external consumption can
affect how a ﬁrm does business. Still, the conduct that
helps optimize collective value may best be generated
within a business organization as it conducts its business,
and not from an external monitoring and control regime
that apprises the visible markers of business activity.
26 For example, Jones and Felps’ (2013b) work to change a corporation’s
objective function is rooted in their quest to ‘‘to improve social welfare for
the US society as a whole’’ (p. 350).
27 These organizations work in ten broad areas: Arts, culture, and
humanities; Education; Environment and animals; Health; Human
services; International, foreign affairs; Public, societal Beneﬁt; Religion
related; Mutual/membership beneﬁt; and Unknown, unclassiﬁed (http://
nccs.urban.org/classiﬁcation/NTEE.cfm).
28 See hhttp://www.census.gov/econ/susb/i for a look at business
operations, hhttp://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/g12_org.pdfi for a look
at government entities, and hhttp://www.urban.org/sites/default/ﬁles/
29 See hhttp://www.worldometers.info/world-population/i for the cur-
rent population of the world and any nation we discuss below, and
hhttp://www.un.org/en/members/#di for a list of the UN’s member
nations.
30 See hhttp://knowhownonproﬁt.org/basics/what-is-non-proﬁti for aalfresco/publication-pdfs/413277-The-Nonproﬁt-Sector-in-Brief–.PDFi
for a look at the NFP sector.
look at the UK’s NFP sector and hhttp://www.npo.gov.za/i for a similar
look at the NFP sector in South Africa.
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ative effects (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012). We believe
t the path to optimized collective value begins with an
orsement of the Dignity Threshold.
With the scale of business activity as large as it is, we
 under no illusion that this diffusion process will be
ple. That said, the idea and importance of dignity is
dly unknown. It has been with us for over two thousand
rs. It has been enshrined in a global human rights
laration and even in some national laws. Combine that
 with the widespread unease we chronicled at the
inning of this paper, and we just may ﬁnd ourselves at a
pitious moment in history to launch what might called
ignitarian social movement in business. This kind of
sformation of business practice will not happen on its
n. It may take a social movement.
ocial movement. A normative theory carries action
lications. It may well be that those who resonate with
se ideas might become what Sunstein (1996, p. 919)
ed ‘‘norm entrepreneurs,’’ those who work to imagine a
 future and create the ‘‘norm bandwagons’’ and ‘‘norm
cades’’ that bring it to life. Academics can certainly play
le by developing the theory that undergirds the new
m and of course, work to make a better world (Walsh,
5). Sunstein (1996, p. 929) nicely articulated the norm
repreneurs’ assignment. Theory in hand, their work
ins by signaling a personal commitment to change.
y also need to ﬁnd fellow travelers to reﬁne their ideas
 help bring them to life. Such coalition members may
 be hard to ﬁnd. Lagon and Arend (2014b), for example,
ently articulated a ‘‘who, what, when, where, why and
’’ agenda for those working to bring a commitment to
an dignity to our international institutions. With
iness as the largest transnational institution on the
rld stage today, our colleagues in public policy might
lcome commitments and contributions from those in
 world of business. Sunstein goes on to argue that
ging new ideas to life will involve a focus on costs and
eﬁts. Norm entrepreneurs need to show that ignoring
 Dignity Threshold seems to be – or is – less costly than
ering to it. They must also show that compliance with
 new norm seems to be – or in fact, is – more beneﬁcial
n operating without it. A cost/beneﬁt calculation, of
rse, implicates a consideration of just what constitutes
st and a beneﬁt; indeed, it calls the question of what
stitutes Business Success.
cess
Business Success is marked optimized Collective Value,
imized subject to clearing the Dignity Threshold. While
 know what we want to see from business in a
ceptual sense, some may ask whether we will know it
en we see it. They will wonder whether we can measure
imized Collective Value. How can we know if decision
kers in companies, government, and the not-for-proﬁt
tor recognize the inherent worth of every Business
ticipant? Can we know whether they lead with practical
dom (phronesis)? How will we know whether their
isions meet the Dignity Threshold? These are mighty
move forward. The ﬁrst is that we need to consider the
relationship between the measurement of success and
success itself. Second, we need to consider the dynamic
nature of the theory, if not any intervention born of the
theory. In particular, we need to consider how to handle
failure on the road to success.
Success and its measurement. We need not look far for
measurement inspiration. Diener and Seligman’s (2004)
quest to create an economy of well-being caught our
attention. We took a careful look at their call for a national
well-being index. They believe that a multimillion-dollar
investment in an annual national survey would bring great
beneﬁt to the American public. They rely on what they call
the ‘‘psychological Heisenberg principle’’ to make their
case:
[W]hat a society measures will in turn inﬂuence the
things that it seeks. . . . If a society systematically and
regularly assesses well-being, people will focus more of
their attention on well-being, and learn more about its
causes (2004, p. 23).
We believe that the reverse of this principle also holds.
If society calls more and more attention to dignity and
collective value in business, then society will in time move
to assess them. Note too that any effort to bring Sunstein’s
(1996) cost/beneﬁt approach to social movement creation
cannot move forward absent a dignity initiative to
investigate if not celebrate. We are impressed and inspired
by the United Kingdom’s Dignity in Care initiative.
Launched in November 2006, the country’s National
Dignity Council has been administering the program ever
since. Their webpage succinctly captures their aspirations:
The campaign’s core values are about having dignity in
our hearts minds and actions, changing the culture of
care services and placing a greater emphasis on
improving the quality of care and the experience of
citizens using services including NHS [National Health
Service] hospitals, community services, care homes and
home support services (http://www.dignityincare.or-
g.uk/About/Dignity_in_Care_campaign/).
They currently count 58,000 ‘‘dignity champions’’ who
work to ensure that people are treated in a respectful and
digniﬁed manner when they use Britain’s health and social
services. Sustained in part by a host of ‘‘dignity champion
networks,’’ these champions and sympathetic health care
providers call nationwide attention to their work every
year in an annual ‘‘dignity action day.’’ Perhaps a similarly
inspired ‘‘Dignity in Business’’ movement will help bring
dignity to the world of business and at the same time serve
as a catalyst to measure Business Success. That certainly
seems to be a worthy aspiration.
While we know of no dedicated effort to collect data on
the digniﬁed treatment of Business Participants, we do
know that some in the world do collect the kinds of data
that Diener and Seligman (2004) desire. More than
20 European countries came together in 2002 to sponsor
a large biennial cross-national survey. The European Social
Survey reports data on personal and societal well-being, even some of the kinds of issues we might envision in allenges. There are two broad issues to consider as we and
T. Donaldson, J.P. Walsh / Research in Organizational Behavior 35 (2015) 181–207202worldwide Dignity in Business survey (e.g., treatment by,
and trust, in various institutions of government).31 The
existence of this international survey effort gives us hope
that we might one day see an international Dignity in
Business survey effort.32 We can imagine a role for
universities in this effort. The University of Chicago with
its National Opinion Research Center and the University of
Michigan with its Institute for Social Research, for
example, might collaborate with other universities in
the world to launch such a global survey effort.
The road to business success. A normative theory is deﬁned
by its aspirations. Our aspirations here are very high. After
all, we invoke a world where collective value is optimized,
where the dignity of every business participant is recog-
nized and honored, where every act and decision in the
world of business clears the Dignity Threshold. We also
imagine a global survey effort to appraise and enable our
movement toward such optimized collective value. Two
fundamental qualities deﬁne this aspiration. First, with
business as our unit of analysis, we are well aware that
our unit of analysis is as macro as can be in our ﬁeld. On
the other hand, the mechanism that fuels this normative
theory is quite micro. Business participants’ everyday acts
of dignity undergird the creation of collective value. This
micro focus may be at once the theory’s strength and its
limitation. The strength is that we do not need to imagine
some kind of supranational governance and control regime
to better the world. Indeed, some would see an omnipotent
and global regulatory regime as more suffocating than
ennobling. All we ask is that each business participant
treats each other with dignity, all the while respecting and
supporting business’s broader purpose. Therein lays the
limitation. Not every business participant in a world of
7.3 billion people will get the message and not everyone
who does will ﬁnd it easy to live such a life. In fact, history
shows us that our species is prone to violence (Pinker,
2011), perhaps the ultimate act of indignity.
How can we stay on the road to Business Success? To be
sure, with even the best of intentions, business partici-
pants will have trouble. Haslam and Loughnan (2014) tell
us that we are prone to dehumanize each other. We also
know that a record of moral behavior in no way guarantees
that we will treat the next person we encounter in a like
fashion. Indeed, the research on moral licensing (Monen
and Miller, 2001) tells us that we can even expect that
moral person to behave immorally or unethically that next
time (Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015; Merritt,
Effron, & Monin, 2010).33 It is not easy to treat every person
we encounter with dignity. Moreover, Hollensbe, Wookey,
Hickey, George, and Nichols, (2014, p. 1230) point out a
peril unique to organizational life. We often encounter
each other not as individuals but as a part of a collective in
an organization. They write, ‘‘each person deserves human
dignity as a who, not a what, as a someone, not a something,
yet much of the language of business subtly objectiﬁes
people generally as ‘‘human capital’’ or ‘‘human resources.’’
The problem is that we can only know so many people by
name. Leaders of large entities, those who by necessity
manage ‘‘human resources,’’ need to remember that each
person in that collective is an individual worthy of dignity.
We need to keep our common humanity in front of mind as
we encounter each other.
The road to Business Success is likely to be a bumpy one.
We can vow to treat others with dignity but it will be hard
to walk that talk. Indeed, social psychological research tells
us just how hard it is to exert self-control in our lives
(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; De Ridder, Lensvelt-
Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, & Baumeister, 2012). Envision-
ing a social movement to bring a fundamental appreciation
of dignity to the world of business, this movement should
also work to support business participants in their avowed
efforts to treat each other with dignity. And when we
inevitably fall short, all we can do is practice restorative
justice. We forgive each other and strive to do better the
next time (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006; Goodstein &
Aquino, 2010). In short, we can handle the indignities of life
in the same way we handle the sometimes-painful legacies
our predecessors left us. We acknowledge them, learn from
them, forgive others (and ourselves if need be), and press
forward in pursuit of the good.
Conclusion
Our goal has been to address the composition fallacy we
discovered in the scholarly world of corporate governance.
Recognizing that no theory of the ﬁrm can serve us well
when we attempt to understand the place of business in
society, we developed what we hope will be the beginnings
of a theory of business. The theory is both empirical and
normative. We developed the conceptual building blocks
for such a theory and then began to specify the
mechanisms that link them. To say that a theory of
business must account for the purpose of business is one
thing, it is something else entirely to articulate just what
that purpose is. We tried to step up to that challenge. Doing
so, we created a normative theory. We can now answer the
riddle we posed at the paper’s beginning: ‘‘Law is to justice,
as medicine is to health, as business is to optimized
collective value.’’
31 See hhttp://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/index.htmli for an
overview of the survey effort and hhttp://www.europeansocialsur-
vey.org/docs/ﬁndings/
ESS6_toplines_issue_5_personal_and_social_wellbeing.pdfi for a look at
their efforts in the area of personal and societal well-being. We should
point out that Australia and the United Kingdom each alone collect the
kinds of index data that Diener and Seligman (2004) desire (see Cummins,
Eckersley, Pallant, Van Vugt, & Misajon, 2003; Self, Thomas, & Randall,
2012 for some discussion of this work). Kahneman and Krueger (2003)
believe we could see such a survey effort in the US one day.
32 The Porter and Stern (2015) effort that we mentioned earlier holds
promise. Using publicly available data (Stern, Wares, & Orzell, 2015, p.
24), their ambitious Social Progress Imperative is very alert to people’s
rights and freedoms the world over. Perhaps as their effort gains steam,
33 We see a similar surprise at the ﬁrm level of analysis. In a paper
entitled ‘‘Why ‘Good’ Firms do Bad Things,’’ Mishina, Dykes, Block, andthey can collaborate with others to collect the kinds of dignity data the
world so needs.
Pollock (2010) showed us that the most successful ﬁrms that are the ones
most prone to illegal behavior.
tion
are
res
res
suc
the
the
crit
ord
(Ts
doe
wo
phr
But
pro
pro
est
dig
cre
we
and
ide
que
ove
we
arts
phi
gist
bus
hel
civi
val
nee
pro
nee
tim
Dig
cre
us 
dre
ago
tes 
que
‘‘So
pro
tha
to 
tho
Ack
wro
aut
And
Cav
T. Donaldson, J.P. Walsh / Research in Organizational Behavior 35 (2015) 181–207 203Our project answers Brief’s (2000) provocative ques-
, ‘‘Whom shall we serve?’’ It may seem quixotic but we
 trying to serve humanity here. In doing so, we are
ponding to Tsui’s (2013) call to create socially
ponsible scholarship. In Tsui’s (2013, p. 381) view,
h scholarship both seeks truth and attempts to improve
 human condition. She quoted Einstein as she identiﬁed
 second criterion. In Einstein’s mind, that second
erion is primary: ‘‘Concern for making life better for
inary humans must be the chief objective of science’’
ui, 2013, p. 380).
We admit that the phrase ‘‘optimized collective value’’
s not roll off the tongue in the same way that the
rds ‘‘justice’’ and ‘‘health’’ do. If forced to sum up the
ase in a word, we would choose the word ‘‘prosperity.’’
 we would do so with a caveat. The deﬁnition of
sperity must be an expansive one. Some view
sperity as simple ﬁnancial well-being. We are inter-
ed in a special kind of well-being, one that honors the
nity of those who affect and are affected by the
ation of that wealth. We are interested in the kind of
ll-being that reﬂects a world of business where its focal
 contextual purposes are met.
We call on our colleagues to reﬁne and extend these
as. Look at our deﬁnitions, propositions, and open
stions. Have we overstated, understated, misstated or
rlooked anything? We have some awareness of what
 do not know. Therefore, we ask our colleagues in the
 and sciences (e.g., anthropologists, economists,
losophers, political scientists, psychologists, sociolo-
s, and more) and the professional schools (e.g.,
iness, law, public health, public policy, and others) to
p us better appreciate how business, government and
l society can work together for the pursuit of collective
ue.
Assuming that these ideas do have some appeal, we
d help to bring our normative ideas to life. How can we
mote dignity for every Business Participant? We will
d to ﬁnd ways to measure Business Success at the same
e that we look for ways to promote it. Great Britain’s
nity in Care initiative and the international effort to
ate and administer the European Social Survey inspire
on both dimensions. Our dream may not be a pipe
am.
Still, we know that these efforts will take time. Years
, Whetton (1989) asked the question, ‘‘What constitu-
a theoretical contribution?’’ He used the six journalists’
stions to answer his own question – and added one, the
 what?’’ question. That last question looms large. This
ject reminds us that legacy matters. Our fondest hope is
t future generations will continue to imagine and work
create a world of business that honors the dignity of
se who affect and are affected by its activity.
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